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Chapter 1
Introduction: Sensorimotor Simulation
and Cognition
The present study is concerned with the impact of perceived animacy of
a stimulus on processes of visuomotor coordination. More specifically, the
study aims to investigate the relative impact of static and dynamic stimulus
features, which indicate its animacy, on perceptuomotor crosstalk between
simultaneous movement observation and execution. Since the present study
is limited to the comparison of movements by an object and by a human
model, the first part of this introduction is dedicated to the human body
and how its understanding has been in constant change in Western thought.
The acknowledgement of our bodily existence, it is argued then, gave rise to
a whole new way of dealing with purely mental phenomena. Central to this
new perspective of embodied cognition is the idea of sensorimotor simulation,
which is introduced in the subsequent section.
1.1 A Short Intellectual History of the Body
In the classic view of Aristotle and Plato, the living human was conceived as
something in the world, by virtue of its body, a thing among other things.
Only by the strength of its mind could the human being transcend its exis-
tence in the midst of other things and gain access to the ordering unity of
the world1. In the resulting conflict between a man’s mind and his body, to
reach this ideal, of course, meant to subdue rather than meet the claims of
the body. The body was a hindrance, for the striving mind an object among
others, which had to be put aside in an effort to ”become pure thought think-
ing itself beyond the primum mobile” (Todes, 2001).
The body was worthless.
1The unity of the world refers to the ontological belief that there is only one actual
world and everything that one can think of is in terms of this one and only world (cf.
Todes, 2001).
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With Descartes came the discovery of human necessity. From his famous
cogito argument, which showed that even the effort to dispose of individual
human existence presupposes the latter, he deduced that the essence of hu-
man existence was to think and that this thinking substance was entirely
distinct from the body and would not cease to be what it was even if the
body did not exist. Thus, the first consequence of Cartesian philosophy for
the body was that it was no longer fixed firmly among other things in the
world, but denied any essential significance for human existence altogether.
The body was gone2.
The ambiguous status of the human subject in Cartesian philosophy as
being placed somewhere above the things in the world, but below identifica-
tion with the ordering unity of the world, gave rise to two diverging schools
of thought, Continental Rationalism and British Empiricism, culminating in
the respective work by Leibniz and Hume. For Leibniz, the rationalist, man’s
personal identity was given by his unified experience of a godly-created or-
dered world and no experiential content was special in a sense that it had a
privileged relation to this identity. The internal horizon of the monads,which
built the body, represented the whole world in its prestabilized harmony, but
the way the human subject experienced having his body was no different
from the way he experienced being in possession of other things. For Hume,
the empiricist, the human subject was a passive spectator detached from his
body and reduced to a disembodied point of view. Sensations from the world
merely stroke upon him, leaving their trace in his explication of the unity of
the world. The body was just an experiential object, a passive receiver of
sensations that were perceived by a disembodied spectator.
The body was a thing among things.
Kant combined the rationalist’s belief of indubitable truths with the em-
piricist’s idea of factual sense experience in arguing that intelligible sense
experience was not immediately given to a Leibnizian monad, but had to be
transformed from mere sensation into intelligible conceptual content, leav-
ing no room for veridical sensory appearances apart from the employment of
abstract concepts. Though Kant recognized the special status of the body
as being the sole source of sense experience to a point at which no mental
2..., which is not completely correct since Descartes actually did not postulate a dualism
but a trialism in that he posited the existence of a third substance in terms of the empirical
unity of body and soul. However, he failed to provide a reasonable account of how this
third substance integrated into his philosophical system.
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activity could be conceived without involvement of the body, all bodily ex-
periences were subject to conceptual judgement.
The body was a concept.
The phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty marked the return to the world
which precedes, abandoning the empiricist’s objects, which were forced upon
a disembodied perceiver, and the rationalist’s objects, which were mere con-
structions of an all-knowing mind. Instead, objects were experienced as ac-
tual revelations to our body by our senses, being unintelligible without ref-
erence to the fundamental bodily activities that seek, solicit, and maintain
their presence. It is the lived, active body that finally provides the unity of
the world in that it is the one and only actual world that can be experienced
by the subject-body.
The body is being in the world.
1.2 The Idea of Sensorimotor Simulation
During the last 20 years, there has been an ever increasing interest in the
complex interaction of the physical body and the surrounding environment
within virtually all the branches of cognitive science, e.g. psychology (e.g.
Turvey, 2004; Turvey & Carello, 1995; Wilson, 2002), philosophy (e.g. Clark,
1997; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991), robotics
(e.g. Arkin, 1998; Brooks & Stein, 1994; Brooks, Breazeal, Marjanovic, Scas-
selati, & Williamson, 1998; Lund, Webb, & Hallam, 1998), neuroscience (e.g.
Chiel & Beer, 1997; Grafton, 2009), and linguistics (e.g. Boroditsky & Ram-
scar, 2002; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). Within the emerging view of what had
been termed as embodied cognition, discontent was voiced about the fact that
traditional cognitive science had only a limited conception of the mind as a
central processor of abstract information without giving proper regard to its
connections to the outside world (cf. Clark, 1998). While perceptual and
motor systems were conceived to be proper areas of scientific inquiry, their
relevance for cognition was simply disregarded in that thought was treated
separately from perception and action. In contrast to this predominant point
of view, there had always been demonstrations of interactions between cog-
nitive and sensorimotor processes.
Paillard (1955), for instance, had participants perform a mental multipli-
cation task and used simultaneously evoked Achilles tendon (T) and Hoff-
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mann (H) reflexes to distinguish activation of the alpha motoneuron and
the gamma motoneuron system during mental calculation. He found an in-
crease of the T-reflex amplitudes while participants were performing covert
multiplications, but no changes in the H-reflex. He interpreted this as an
increased activation of the fusimotor system based on a changed sensitiv-
ity of muscle spindles, presumably originating within the brainstem, where
the reticular formation (Granit & Kaada, 1952; Eldred & Fujimori, 1958)
and the red nucleus (Appelberg & Jeneskog, 1972) were shown to exert a
facillatory influence on the gamma motor neuron system. While this finding
could be regarded as a rather unspecific effect of general arousal on fusimotor
functioning, Davis (1939) demonstrated more specific effects of mental arith-
metics on sensorimotor behaviour. He had participants covertly perform
various psychological tasks and simultaneously measured their electromyo-
graphic responses. The analysis of the EMG recordings revealed that each
task was associated with a specific pattern of muscular activity, such that
performing mental calculations elicited electromyographic gradients in the
right forearm extensor muscles of right-handers. More recent neurophysio-
logical studies reported an increase in regional blood flow in the prefrontal
and parieto-temporal association cortices (e.g. Roland & Friberg, 1985), but
also in the cerebellar hemisphere (Decety, Sjoeholm, Ryding, Stenberg, &
Ingvar, 1990; Ryding, Decety, Sjoeholm, Stenberg, & Ingvar, 1993) while
subjects were engaged in arithmetical counting. Modern-day research on the
neuronal basis of mental arithmetics implied that the posterior part of the
cerebellar cortex belonged to a motor finger representation network, together
with the left precentral gyrus, the anterior part of the intraparietal sulcus and
the right superior occipital gyrus, which is assumed to underlie numerical
knowledge (Zago et al., 2001). The idea of a covert use of finger represen-
tations, at least for simple arithmetic tasks such as arithmetic fact retrieval
(Zago et al., 2001) suggests that humans might actually think embodiedly,
i.e. that mental phenomena cannot be conceived without sensorimotor pro-
cesses that control bodily movement. As a consequence, theoretical models
that assign purely motor functions to brain areas such as the cerebellum are
unreasonably narrow. Instead, it seems more plausible to assume an elab-
orate information-processing system, which controls movement but is also
bidirectionally connected with parallel systems that subserve ”pure” cogni-
tive functions such as reasoning, language, and emotion (cf. Leiner, Leiner,
& Dow, 1993). Accordingly, Ito (1993) suggested that ideas and concepts
could in principle be manipulated in the same way as limbs are manipulated
in the course of movement execution, and, as a consequence, that thought
and movement do not differ in terms of being a controlled object. Once
encoded in the brain, they could both be controlled via the same neuronal
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circuitry, giving rise to the formation of internal models of body dynamics,
but also of the dynamics of mental representations in the microstructures of
the cerebellum (cf. Ito, 2008).
The idea that oﬄine-cognition, i.e. cognitive processes that are detached
from current sensory input and motor output, was based on a sensorimotor
representation of the body, opened up a new perspective on the cognitive
strategies employed by the human agent. Many abstract cognitive abilities
might actually employ sensorimotor functions in the way described above.
Mental structures that especially developed to subserve perception and ac-
tion execution might be adopted to augment cognitive processes, giving rise
to the idea that sensorimotor resources could be used to run a simulation of
particular aspects of the physical world as means of representing information
or drawing inferences (e.g. Grush, 1995, 2004; Jeannerod, 2001, 2006). Sen-
sorimotor simulation has indeed been found to be crucial for many functions
in human oﬄine-cognition such as mental imagery (e.g. Grush, 2004; Koss-
lyn, Pascual-Leone, Felician, & Camposano, 1999; Jeannerod, 2004), working
memory (e.g Wilson, 2001b), and reasoning (e.g. Damasio, 1994).
There is no a priori reason why sensorimotor simulations should be lim-
ited to oﬄine-cognition and indeed, many theories exist that conceive such
simulation processes as the basis for online cognitive functions, i.e. cognitive
processes that continuously receive input from the senses or generate control
signals to move the body in the environment, such as visual discrimination
(e.g. Miall et al., 1996; Zwickel, Grosjean, & Prinz, 2007), language compre-
hension (e.g. Gallese, 2005; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Rizzolatti & Arbib,
1998), action understanding (e.g. Blakemore & Decety, 2001; Jackson & De-
cety, 2004; Jeannerod, 2001), or the coordination of joint action (e.g. Sebanz,
Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006).
Consequently, based on the idea that particular aspects of online- as well
as oﬄine-cognition are based on a covert simulation of bodily actions, i.e.
that simulation is embodied, the core theoretical contribution of embodiment
to cognition as conceived in this study refers to the existence of a representa-
tional system that specifically encodes knowledge of man’s bodily existence
along with the body’s functional capabilities in interacting with the world
(for a systematic review of additional postulates of embodied cognition, see
Wilson, 2002). Such a representational system is necessarily required as a
knowledge base from which sensorimotor simulation can be used to augment
the kinds of processes mentioned above (cf. Grafton, 2009).
The existence of such a specific knowledge system dedicated to the rep-
resentation of the embodied existence of animate agents implicates that the
perception of animate agents, especially that of conspecifics, constitutes a
special event in the perception of objects in the environment radically differ-
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ent from the perception of inanimate objects. This assumption is supported
by two naive notions, that of relevance and that of expertise (cf. Wilson,
2001a). On the one hand, bodies might comprise a special status due to the
high evolutionary relevance of processing bodily stimuli. Global form and
surface features that indicate animacy of an object, i.e. structural cues such
as the availability of parts with biological functions (limbs), or biologically
relevant surface textures (hair, faces), might have evolved to automatically
attract a perceiver’s attention since these features represent the conduits of
social interaction. On the other hand, humans by virtue of having a body
of themselves possess a high degree of expertise in controlling bodily move-
ments. This expertise can be used to facilitate perception of other bodies by
directly matching perceived dynamic information, i.e. kinematic cues such as
motion onsets, motion trajectories or velocity profiles, to the configuration
and movements of one’s own body. Such a kinematic isomorphism based on
the biomechanical properties of the body and the physical laws governing its
interactions with the world makes it reasonable to assume that coordinated
interactions with animate stimuli are achieved in a qualitatively different
way than interactions with inanimate objects, which is due to the privileged
perceptual status of the former.
The aim of the present study was to elucidate the relative impact of
the presence of a human body and the presence of biological kinematics on
visuomotor coordination. More specifically, it was examined whether the
presence of those two features particularly affects perceptuomotor crosstalk,
which is normally observed when perception and action planning/execution
rely on a representational system that is responsible for actual movement
execution as well as sensorimotor simulation.
1.3 Thesis Outline
The idea that animate and inanimate objects are processed differently by the
cognitive system on a quite fundamental level is explored in chapter 2 with
an excursion that depicts behavioural consequences of the animate/inanimate
distinction in infancy along with its developmental origins, demonstrating
that sensorimotor simulation plays a crucial role in this development. Infants’
perceptions are ideally suited to provide insights into how objects in the
world are treated differently according to their animacy because they are
not yet overformed by internalized constraints based on cultural learning.
The chapter ends with the conjecture that an infant’s intuitive conception
of animacy is based on a process of sensorimotor simulation, which matches
observed object motion to the motor properties of the perceiving infant.
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Assuming that sensorimotor simulation is the basis for the distinction
between animate and inanimate objects, the focus of chapter 3 is on the
neural substrates of sensorimotor simulation. The discovery of mirror neurons
in various parts of the monkey brain is discussed, followed by an analysis of
a functionally similar system in the human brain, which is referred to as
the action-observation-execution-matching system. This denomination was
chosen in order to account for the present uncertainty of whether mirror
neurons also exist in the human brain and furthermore to express a functional
characterization of such a network instead of a mere anatomical reference to
the presence of mirror neurons.
Having established the biological reality of a representational system that
maps observed actions to executable actions on the part of the observer,
and thereby providing the necessary representational basis for sensorimotor
simulation, chapter 4 explores the organization of this action-observation-
execution-matching system in terms of specialization of different subsystems,
which are related in a hierarchical fashion. Then, a computational model
of sensorimotor control is described (MOSAIC Wolpert & Kawato, 1998;
Haruno, Wolpert, & Kawato, 2001; Wolpert, Doya, & Kawato, 2003), in
which the concept of internal models is introduced. It is proposed that inter-
nal models are useful to relate the subsystems within the action-observation-
execution matching system to form a sensorimotor simulation loop.
In chapter 5 reviews empirical evidence in order to characterize the
modus operandi of the action-observation-execution-matching system with
respect to interactions between perception and action, referred to as percep-
tuomotor crosstalk. Different varieties of perceptuomotor crosstalk are intro-
duced, assimilation and contrast. A theoretical account of perceptuomotor
crosstalk, the Theory of Event Coding (Hommel, Mu¨sseler, Aschersleben, &
Prinz, 2001), is outlined, which is going to provide the necessary vocabulary
to discuss perceptuomotor crosstalk in the following experiments.
In chapter 6, the initially described idea of the animate-inanimate dis-
tinction is picked up in order to re-review the literature on perceptuomotor
crosstalk, but with special regard to the sensitivity of the action-observation-
execution-matching system to the animate-inanimate distinction. This leads
to the central question of this study of how the presence of a human body
and biological kinematics affect perceptuomotor crosstalk within the action-
observation-execution-matching-system.
Chapters 7-11 constitute the empirical part of the thesis. After intro-
ducing general aspects of the study such as purpose, task, and paradigm, four
experiments dealing with individuals’ visuomotor coordination performance
with regard to animate and inanimate stimuli are described. Experiment 1
investigates perceptuomotor crosstalk during response selection and move-
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ment execution in the presence of and absence of perceptual cues indicating
animacy within an observed action. Experiment 2 focuses on the nature of
the perceptuomotor crosstalk observed in Experiment 1 and the effects of
different visuomotor mappings. Experiment 3 explores the interaction of dif-
ferent frames of reference for the observed perceptuomotor crosstalk. Finally,
Experiment 4 aims to elucidate the generalizability of the effects found in the
first three experiments to the execution of a more complex movement.
Chapter 12 closes the thesis with a general discussion of its empirical
findings. Initially, the central findings of the four experiments of this thesis
are reviewed. The subsequent discussion centres around the impact of ani-
macy on perceptuomotor crosstalk and touches upon some particularities of
the observed effects.
Chapter 2
Sensorimotor Simulation and the
Animate-Inanimate Distinction in Infancy
The capacity to categorize things in one’s environment as animate beings or
as inanimate objects is a fundamental cognitive ability, which develops early
in life and presumably corresponds to a domain-specific knowledge system
that is subserved by distinct neural mechanisms (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998;
Mahon & Caramazza, 2009). With respect to the development of such con-
ceptual knowledge, the ability of infants to discriminate people and objects
has been the focus of much research because the person-object differentia-
tion as established during the first two years of life can be conceived as a
precursor for the broader distinction between animate and inanimate enti-
ties, which in turn has been proposed to form the basis of the more inclusive
biological-nonbiological distinction (cf. Poulin-Dubois, Lepage, & Ferland,
1996).
Infants are naive to the world. Neither do they come fully equipped
with semantic knowledge about the ways of the world nor do they possess
a sophisticated episodic memory system yet. Thus, studying infants can in-
form us about how animate and inanimate entities are distinguished without
reference to interindividual differences in the beliefs regarding the essential
properties of biological entities.
It has been shown that in later stages of development, conceptual knowl-
edge can be detached from the domain in which it developed. Thus, features
that have been associated with animate objects can transcend the animate-
inanimate distinction, for example in ascribing psychological constructs as
desires and intentions to the motion of geometrical shapes (Heider, 1944;
Heider & Simmel, 1944) or other inanimate entities such as clouds (cf. Pi-
aget, 1976). However, it is assumed that at the initial stages of development,
the differential behaviour that is organized along the animate-inanimate dis-
tinction is still limited to the domain in which it developed, and thus reflects
an intuitive understanding of the concept of animacy. Therefore, the follow-
ing overview of the role of animacy in infants’ interaction with persons and
inanimate objects is limited to the first two years of age.
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2.1 Differential Responding to Animate and Inanimate
Objects
Infants quickly become sensitive to differences between persons and inan-
imate objects. Already newborns between two and six days of age show
differential patterns of motor responses to people versus objects. Roennqvist
and von Hofsten (1994) compared newborns’ motor behaviour in the presence
of an animate human agent with motor responses to the presentation of an
inanimate object. They reported that the observation of a human actor led
to an overall increase in finger movement frequency, which was found to be
especially pronounced for transitional opening and closing movements of the
hands. The presentation of a ball, which triggered only half as many move-
ments, elicited mainly thumb-index finger activity and forward extensions of
the arm, movements that had previously been described to be common in the
preparation of reaching and grasping (cf. van Hofsten, 1984). It should be
noted that these movements do not possess a manipulative function at this
age. It is not until around nine months of age that infants start to use the
pincer grip to pick up small objects (cf. van Hofsten & Roennqvist, 1988).
Since the experiments conducted by Roennqvist and von Hofsten (1994) con-
trolled for unspecific effects of arousal in response to animate and inanimate
objects, it seems reasonable to infer that animacy might indeed trigger spe-
cific modes of interaction, a social mode for animate and an object mode for
inanimate entities (cf. Trevarthen, 1986).
At two months of age, infants have further refined and extended their
behavioural repertoire in response to animate and inanimate objects. They
attend to persons with eye contact, vocalizations, and social gestures such
as pointing, whereas they greet an inanimate object with incipient manip-
ulatory actions such as grasping, showing only little or no communicative
behaviour (Brazelton, Koslowski, & Main, 1974; Ellsworth, Muir, & Hains,
1993; Legerstee, Corter, & Kienapple, 1990; Trevarthen, 1977). With respect
to communicative actions, Legerstee, Pomerleau, Malcuit, and Feider (1987),
for instance, showed that upon presentation of a communicative adult, babies
smiled, vocalized and exhibited complex gaze patterns, whereas they contin-
uously fixated inanimate, but responsive objects and engaged in increased
arm activity. Furthermore, when being confronted with an unresponsive,
still-faced adult, those infants showed signs of distress, which were not found
in response to other familiar static objects. However, these pattern of findings
is not unequivocally replicated so that, as is the case in many studies dealing
with participants at this age, the reliability of those findings is subject to
debate (Frye, Rawling, Moore, & Myers, 1983; Sylvester-Bradley, 1985).
With respect to manual actions, it has been shown that two-month-olds
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produced hand and arm actions in relation to affective states, gaze behaviour
and vocalizations (Fogel & Hannan, 1985). Legerstee et al. (1990) demon-
strated that these sequential behavioural linkages were differentially orga-
nized for animate and inanimate stimuli. They found pointing to be associ-
ated with gazing, smiling and vocalization. This was specific for the presence
of the communicating mother. To a passive mother, infants responded with
closed hands, averted gaze, and distressed facial expressions. A passive doll,
on the other hand, led to the co-occurrence of gazing, arm extension, and
hand opening, presumably a developmental step towards reaching and grasp-
ing in order to explore objects that are currently at the centre of fixation.
Further support for the contention of differential responding of infants
towards animate and inanimate objects comes from studies on babies’ ex-
ploratory behaviour. As infants master independent locomotion, they begin
to actively explore their surroundings. In a study by Eckerman and Rhein-
gold (1974) ten-month-old infants viewed either a novel toy or an unfamiliar
person. Infants chose to approach and make contact with the toy, but re-
mained at a distance from the person, showing elevated frequencies of regard
and smiling, even more so when the person talked and smiled back. Thus,
exploratory behaviour also includes social and non-social components, which
are activated with respect to the status of animacy of its target. The same
pattern of results was found in a study by Poulin-Dubois et al. (1996). Nine-
month-olds were found to approach and manipulate a robot, but refrained
from approaching a present stranger, again showing increased frequencies of
communicative behaviour (smiling, vocalization) toward the unfamiliar per-
son. As a sidenote, it seems as if infants also distinguish between animals
and persons in that they show sustained attention towards animals (as com-
pared to inanimate objects), but reserve social behaviour such as smiling and
vocalization for people (Ricard & Allard, 1993).
2.2 Differential Reasoning about Animate and Inanimate
Objects
At six to seven months of age, infants begin to understand that events unfold
in a world where things have to make sense according to certain general
principles. Using preferred looking methods1, it was shown that with respect
to inanimate objects, infants knowledge apparently comprises three principles
1The most common paradigm is the habituation-dishabituation of looking technique.
Here, infants are repeatedly confronted with a stimulus until the infant begins to lose
interest in the stimulus as indicated by the length of succeeding unbroken looks. After
this, various slightly modified versions of the stimulus are presented and any renewed
interest can be identified based on a comparison with an unchanged baseline stimulus.
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that constrain their understanding of object motion.
The principle of cohesion refers to the fact that an object is a separate
entity with clear boundaries of its extension, i.e., it does neither disperse into
several subparts nor merge with other objects in the course of movement.
According to the principle of continuity, objects follow a path of motion
that is continuous and does not lead to the occupation of the same spatial
location by two different objects at the same time (e.g. Baillargeon, 1986;
Spelke, Breinlinger, Macomber, & Jacobson, 1992). Finally, the principle of
contact asserts that objects interact only if they come in direct contact with
each other (Ball, 1973; Leslie, 1988; Oakes & Cohen, 1995). Despite different
methods and stimuli, the convergence of empirical findings corroborate the
validity of these principles, thereby supporting the existence of a central
system in infant cognition that applies inviolable principles to maintain a
model of the world by means of a conceptual identification of sensory input
(cf. Leslie, 1988).
However, studies that examined the generality of those principles showed
that infants apparently form different expectations about how animate and
inanimate entities behave in the world. While the first two principles, co-
hesion and continuity, seem to apply to the motions of all material objects,
the principle of contact does not necessarily apply to human actions. Conse-
quently, it was shown that six-to-seven-month-olds represent successive mo-
tions of two inanimate objects as causally related only if those two objects
come in direct contact with each other (Ball, 1973; Leslie, 1988; Oakes & Co-
hen, 1995). A similar causal link is represented for the interaction of animate
agents without contact as indicated by longer looking times for a no-contact-
event involving inanimate objects as compared to people (Spelke, Phillips,
& Woodward, 1995; Woodward, Phillips, & Spelke, 1993). Thus, infants
do not apply the principle of contact to people, which apparently supports
the assertion that infants reason differently about animate and inanimate
entities.
Straightforward support for a development of differential reasoning during
the first six months also comes from a recent study by Molina, Walle, Condry,
and Spelke (2004), who assessed preferential looking behaviour in four-to-
six-month-old infants and experimentally varied the naturalness of observed
person-person and person-object interactions. They found that only the six-
month-old infants unequivocally preferred to look at videotaped events of a
person speaking to another person and a person manipulating an object in
contrast to the complementary conditions of person-person-manipulation and
person-object-communication. Apparently, six-month-old infants understand
that communicative actions such as smiling and talking are more naturally
directed to a conspecific, whereas grasping and manipulating are more natu-
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rally associated with inanimate objects (cf. Molina et al., 2004). This shows
that the animate-inanimate distinction in infancy is a meaningful distinction,
which provides a basis for evaluating the interactions that are appropriate
for entities in each category.
Further evidence for differential reasoning was presented by Carlson-
Luden (1979), who showed that ten-month-old infants learned to move an
object by pushing a lever, but did not learn to make a human model wave
and smile via the same action, as well as by Poulin-Dubois et al. (1996),
who exposed nine-to-twelve-month-old infants to an independently moving
radio-controlled robot. The latter study found that infants in both age groups
considered autonomous motion, no matter if it was self-propelled or remotely
controlled via verbal commands by the infant’s mother, to be anomalous in
an inanimate object as indicated by increased negative affect and attentive
behaviour towards the moving robot.
2.3 Differential Understanding of Animate and Inanimate
Objects
Between 14 and 18 months of age, another step in development that is ap-
parently sensitive to the animate-inanimate distinction takes place. Infants
demonstrate that they conceive other people as agents that possess mental
states such as goals, intentions, and desires. Until now, the infants’ concept
of animacy seemed to be limited to a negative notion of what inanimate
objects could not do. However, at this stage, infants have apparently devel-
oped a positive understanding of human action, i.e., an appreciation of what
animate agents can do.
Older infants’ understanding of intentional action has preferentially been
studied in imitation tasks, in which infants observed demonstrations of acci-
dental actions (e.g. Carpenter, Akhtar, & Tomasello, 1998; Tilden, Poulin,
& Desroches, 1997; Tomasello & Barton, 1994) or actions, whose intended
outcome had not been achieved (unfulfilled intentions; e.g. Johnson, Booth,
& O’Hearn, 2001; Meltzoff & Moore, 1995). In support of a positive un-
derstanding of others’ actions, Carpenter et al. (1998) showed that 14-to-
18-month-olds were able to discriminate between action outcomes that had
been produced intentionally and action outcomes that had been produced
accidentally in that they subsequently imitated only observed purposive mo-
tor acts but not accidental ones. Furthermore, Tilden et al. (1997) described
that infants used inferences about an actor’s desires to subsequently evaluate
his or her action with respect to the inferred mental state. With respect to
unfulfilled intentions, Meltzoff and Moore (1995) reported that 18-month-old
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infants were able to perform a motor act that they had never seen realised in
response to the repeated observation of a failed attempt to complete the re-
spective action by a human model. Most interestingly in the present context
was their finding that when infants were confronted with a mechanical device
that also failed to perform the same action, they also failed to produce the
target action. Meltzoff and Moore (1995) concluded that while infants were
apparently able to code observed actions in terms of their goals, they did so
with respect to the animacy of the agent, i.e. ascribing goals to persons, but
not to inanimate objects.
2.4 Simulation as a Basis for the Animate-Inanimate
Distinction
With respect to theoretical perspectives on the emergence of conceptual un-
derstanding of animacy in infants, the debate has centred around the contro-
versy between nativist accounts versus empiricist accounts. While the former
emphasize the importance of innate domain-specific knowledge systems that
constrain learning in a top-down fashion, the latter highlight the contribution
of early perceptual processes and low-level associative learning mechanisms
for the development of the animate-inanimate distinction.
Even though they differ with respect to domain-specificity, both theoret-
ical approaches emphasize features of object motion as crucial for the devel-
opment of the animate-inanimate distinction. Indeed, motion is an effective
visual stimulus for capturing infants’ attention (e.g. Girelli & Luck, 1997)
and moving stimuli are furthermore preferably attended to as compared to
stationary stimuli (e.g. Burnham, 1987; Shaddy & Colombo, 2004; Slater,
1989). Premack (1990), for instance, argued that newborns were innately
sensitive to the distinction between self-propelled and non-self-propelled mo-
tion, i.e. state changes without assistance from other objects versus state
changes because of another object’s intervention under conditions of spatial
and temporal contiguity. According to his nativist theory of self-propelled ob-
jects, infants expected self-moving objects to engage in goal-directed actions,
ultimately giving rise to the perception of intentionality for self-propelled and
of causality for non-self-propelled motion. The attribution of intentionality
based on the observation of self-propelled motion of an object designated
this object as an animate entity, whereas the attribution of causality classi-
fied moving objects as inanimate. Premack (1990) argued that this process of
attribution was not based on repeated experience but on proper stimulation
of hard-wired neural circuits.
However, it seems implausible to assume that self-propelled motion is a
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sufficient condition for identifying an object as animate since this ”would flood
our perceptual system with false positives” (Csibra, Gergely, Biro, Koos, &
Brockbank, 1999). Accordingly, Mandler (1992) proposed an empirical ac-
count of conceptual development according to which young infants acquired
conceptual primitives based on an innate analysis of the perceptual display.
This analysis was conceived to capture abstract characteristics of objects’
structure and motion properties. As a result, this gradual development en-
dowed infants with the ability to distinguish animate from inanimate ob-
jects. Movement-related conceptual primitives were the primary source of
this distinction. More specifically, Mandler (1992) posited three types of
movement-related conceptual primitives, which together form the first con-
cept of animacy: (a) motion onset (see above), (b) motion trajectory (linear
vs. nonlinear), and, in accordance with the principle of contact, (c) contin-
gency of motion (interaction over a distance vs. interaction via direct con-
tact). It is important to note that only the process of analysis was conceived
to be innate and that discrimination performance was based on repeated
analyses of perceptual content.
Thus, regardless of their epistemological nature, theories of the animate-
inanimate distinction in infancy have explicitly emphasized the role of object
movement as a decisive factor for distinguishing between animate and inan-
imate entities.
However, the above mentioned theoretical approaches remain vague with
respect to how motion cues came to be crucial in the first place. They have to
resort to postulating innate mechanisms for specific perceptual features, but
why those features are concerned with motion remains unexplained. One
reason might be that infants are particularly sensitive to moving stimuli.
This heightened sensitivity might result from the differential development
of cortical and subcortical structures that control visual attention. While
cortical control develops during the first several months, subcortical control
is present from birth. Here, the superior colliculus receives massive input
from the magnocellular visual pathway, which is highly sensitive to motion,
and can thus bias subcortical control of visual attention towards moving
stimuli (cf. Colombo, 2001). However, there still remains the question why
evolution favoured faster development of neural pathways that are concerned
with analyzing motion information from the environment.
Meltzoff and Decety (2003) provided an explanation for the importance
of motion cues to distinguish animate from inanimate objects by postulating
that motor imitation was the functional mechanism that was favoured by
evolution and underlies the understanding of animacy in infancy. Animate
beings, in this case conspecifics, were conceived to stand out in the perceptual
array because they represented a distinct class of imitable stimuli, i.e., stimuli
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whose configurations and movements could be directly mapped on the infant’s
own bodily configurations and movements. Consequently, the identification
of people was based on their ability to perform biomechanically possible body
movements, which the infant could map onto his body scheme (Meltzoff &
Moore, 1995; Meltzoff & Decety, 2003). Only movements that could be
successfully matched were classified as a human act and became, for instance,
endowed with goals. This matching process was thought to be based on what
Meltzoff and Moore (1997) conceived to be a foundational body scheme,
which provided an innate link between the perception and production of
animate actions in terms of shared neural representations (cf. Meltzoff &
Decety, 2003).
Chapter 3
Neural Substrates of Sensorimotor
Simulation
The hypothesis that we are able to recognize and understand the actions
of animate others in a privileged way by simulating their actions with our
own motor system (e.g. Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004; Jeannerod,
2004; Wolpert et al., 2003) implies the existence of a neural system that
directly matches the visual representation of an observed movement to our
own motor representation of the same action by covertly activating the motor
programs necessary to perform the observed movement (Rizzolatti, Fogassi,
& Gallese, 2001). The general idea is that the production and perception
of actions are functionally connected by a system that predicts the expected
sensorimotor consequences of one’s own and of others’ actions relying on
common neural networks in the premotor and parietal cortices, which match
observed and executed actions within a common representational format.
In this chapter, the neural underpinnings of such a matching system are
reviewed, starting with the so-called mirror neurons found in the monkey
brain and proceeding towards evidence for the existence of a functionally
similar action-observation-execution-matching system in the human brain.
3.1 Neurophysiological Basis
Discoveries in neurophysiology made during the 1990s provided empirical
support for concepts emphasizing the close interdependence of perception
and action (e.g. Gibson, 1979; James, 1890; Lotze, 1852). Single neuron
recordings in area F5 in the ventral premotor cortex of behaving monkeys
showed that neurons in this part of the monkey brain specifically code goal-
directed motor acts such as grasping, holding, or other object-related motor
actions (Rizzolatti et al., 1988). Furthermore, these neurons were found to
be highly selective for both the type of action and the specific movement
configuration. This indicates that F5 neurons can code movements in ab-
stract terms, such as the goal of a motor act regardless of its endeffector,
(Rizzolatti et al., 1988; Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 2000), but
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can also encode the specific way in which a given goal could be accomplished
(Jeannerod, Arbib, Rizzolatti, & Sakata, 1995).
Besides the majority of pure motor neurons in F5, there is a subpopu-
lation of about 20 percent that shares the motor properties of the former,
but also responds vigourously to specific visual stimuli. According to the vi-
sual stimuli effective for triggering activity of those neurons, two completely
different categories of visuomotor neurons are distinguished.
Neurons of the first category respond to the observation of three-dimen-
sional objects whose size and shape are congruent with the motor act coded
by the neuron. Those neurons were termed canonical F5 neurons (Rizzolatti
et al., 1988; Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998). For example, canonical grasping
neurons were found to be active during a precision grip, but also responded
to small objects, whereas neurons that encoded a whole-hand grip also re-
sponded to large objects in the absence of any detectable movement (e.g.
Jeannerod et al., 1995; Murata et al., 1997; Rizzolatti et al., 1988).
A second category of visuomotor neurons in area F5 was described to
respond to the observation of actions performed by another individual as
long as those actions were similar to the motor act coded by the neuron.
Based on this congruency between motorically coded action and observed
actions that evoke the visual discharge, those neurons were named mirror
neurons (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996).
The essence of both types of neurons is the transformation of specific
sensory information into a motor format. Accordingly, it has been proposed
that the visuomotor coupling in canonical neurons could be conceived as
the neural substrate of the sensorimotor transformations necessary to adapt
the hand to a given object, neurally implementing Gibson’s concept of af-
fordances (Gibson, 1979). This is especially plausible since a considerable
percentage of canonical neurons shows increased activation during execution
of a particular grip and in response to various objects that differed in shape,
but all afforded the same grip type. The visuomotor coupling of mirror neu-
rons, on the other hand, has been suggested to embody the basis of imitation
and action understanding by neurally implementing a matching system that
directly relates observed actions to their execution (e.g. Fadiga & Craighero,
2003).
3.2 The Parieto-Frontal Mirror Neuron System in Monkeys
Within the cytoarchitectonic organization of area F5 in the macaque mon-
key, canonical neurons are mainly found in the dorsal part of the posterior
bank of the arcuate sulcus (area F5p), whereas mirror neurons are located
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within a sector lying on the cortical convexity (F5c; cf. Belmalih, 2008).
A third sector (F5a) located ventrally from F5p also seems to contain neu-
rons with mirror properties, although this is based on fMRI data instead
of single-cell-recordings (Nelissen, Luppino, Vanduffel, Rizzolatti, & Orban,
2005). Interestingly, it has been suggested that neurons in F5a and F5c
respond to observed motor acts in different ways. While F5c responds to
an individual performing a motor act, F5a responds when just the relevant
effector is visible, suggesting different representations of different degrees of
specificity (Nelissen et al., 2005).
Another distinction between different types of mirror neurons has been
drawn according to the degree of congruency between observed and executed
actions that is necessary for neurons to respond. While strictly congruent
mirror neurons are only active when observed and executed motor acts are
identical in terms of goal and movement, broadly congruent neurons do not
require action identity but similarity in that their activity is confined to the
goal of an action (Gallese et al., 1996). The latter type of neuron is appar-
ently, at least to some degree, able to recognize the goal of an observed action
across many instances of its observed execution. This led to the assumption
that mirror neurons in area F5 are functionally related to a network that
is responsible for action recognition in that they place the individual in the
same internal state as when the observed action was actually performed.
Consistent with this, Umilta` et al. (2001) found that a subset of mirror
neurons discharged under conditions when the last, critical part of the ob-
served action was occluded, so that the monkey was unable to observe the
actual object manipulation. However, the monkey had to know that there was
an object behind the occluder and see how the experimenter’s hand moved
behind the occluder. This indicates that if there is enough information to
build a mental representation of the observed motor act, a subpopulation
of mirror neurons can recognize the movement in terms of its outcome. By
simulating the action, inferences about the goals of the observed behaviour
of others can be drawn based on the activity of motor neurons that code the
goal of the same action in the observer’s brain.
Another subset of F5 mirror neurons has been shown to respond not
only to visual observation or actual execution of a particular action, but also
to auditory stimuli that are specifically associated with it. These so-called
audiovisual mirror neurons discriminate, for instance, between the sound
of breaking a peanut or ripping a piece of paper (Keysers et al., 2003;
Kohler et al., 2002). This activation of premotor neural circuitry normally
controlling the execution of an action by visual as well as auditory information
related to the same action can be conceived as a further piece of evidence in
support of the biological reality of action simulation (cf. Gallese, 2005).
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Besides area F5 in the ventral premotor cortex, mirror neurons were also
found in the inferior parietal lobule (Gallese, Fogassi, Fadiga, & Rizzolatti,
2002). Those parietal mirror neurons are characterized by the fact that they
respond differently when the same motor act is part of different actions (e.g.
grasp to eat versus grasp to place). This indicates that the parietal mirror
system can encode the same motor act in different ways depending on the
goal of the action in which the observed motor act is embedded (Fogassi
et al., 2005). Because of this it has been suggested that mirror neurons
within the inferior parietal lobule can not only infer action goals in terms
of an action’s outcome, a property commonly assigned to mirror neurons
(cf. Gallese et al., 1996), but also facilitate the understanding of the inten-
tions of others during action observation. By taking context and object type
into account, an expected course of action based on mirror activity within
the inferior parietal lobule is predicted, so that similar motor acts become
discriminatable in terms of their anticipated action goal and the underlying
intention of the actor.
The studies cited above all examined transitive actions, i.e. they em-
ployed experimental tasks that involved actions comprising object manipu-
lation. The presence of manipulatable objects has been conceived to be a
necessary requirement for the activation of mirror neurons (e.g. Press, Bird,
Walsh, & Heyes, 2008; Umilta` et al., 2001). However, a small subset of
mirror neurons in the most lateral part of F5, where mostly mouth-related
mirror neurons can be found, were reported to discharge upon observation
of intransitive, communicative facial actions such as lip-smacking or tongue-
protrusion (communicative mirror neurons, Ferrari, Gallese, Rizzolatti, &
Fogassi, 2003).
In order to fully characterize the mirror neuron system in the monkey
brain, there is another region of the cortex comprising a population of neurons
that is similar in function to mirror neurons and is thus closely related to the
parieto-frontal mirror system. This population is predominantly located in
the region of the superior temporal sulcus, especially in its lower bank. Both
neuronal populations respond similarly to the observation of action in that
they are able to generalize to different realizations of the same action, do not
respond in the absence of a manipulatable object, and are also selective for
biological effectors (e.g. Oram & Perrett, 1996; Perrett, Rolls, & Caan, 1982;
Perrett et al., 1990). However, only mirror neurons also show movement-
related activity, which is lacking in neurons within the superior temporal
sulcus.
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3.3 The Action-Observation-Execution-Matching System in
Humans
Several studies using different methodologies have demonstrated that a match-
ing system similar to the the mirror system found in monkeys also exists in
humans. With respect to humans, the term action-observation-execution-
matching system is used instead of the more common denomination mirror
system in order to avoid the impression that the existence of mirror neurons
in humans is a scientific fact. It is not. All assertions made below reflect the
function of a neural network distributed across the brain and it has yet to be
proven that mirror neurons are truly a part of it.
3.3.1 TMS
One of the first studies demonstrating mirror-neuron-like activation in hu-
mans was conducted by Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, and Rizzolatti (1995). Using
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), they observed a significant increase
in motor evoked potentials (MEPs) during action observation, which corre-
sponded to the muscle activity recorded during actual movement execution.
Further research showed that this facilitation effect originated on the cortical
level (Strafella & Paus, 2000) but was counteracted on the spinal level (Bald-
issera, Cavallari, Craighero, & Fadiga, 2001). Thus, it appears as if action
observation triggered a covert simulation process on the cortical level, whose
overt execution was inhibited on the spinal level. Other important aspects
of the human action-observation-execution-matching system demonstrated
by TMS refer to the finding of increased cortical excitability, regardless of
whether the observed movements were goal-directed actions or intransitive
movements such as meaningless manual gestures (Fadiga et al., 1995; Maeda,
Kleiner-Fisman, & Pascual-Leone, 2002), as well as the observation that
motor cortical excitability followed the time course of the observed manual
movements (Gangitano, Mottaghy, & Pascual-Leone, 2001). Furthermore,
Urgesi, Moro, Candidi, and Aglioti (2006) have recently demonstrated that
this increased corticospinal excitability can also be found when participants
only view still photographs of hands positioned in a pincer grip as compared
to pictures of hands in a resting position. This supports the notion that ac-
tivation of the action-observation-execution system can be triggered by form
cues in the absence of any kinematic information.
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3.3.2 EEG
Additional support for the existence of a functional homologue of the monkey
mirror system in humans was reported by Cochin, Barthelemy, Roux, and
Martineau (1999), who employed quantified electroencephalography (qEEG).
They had participants repeatedly perform or observe bimanual pincer move-
ments of the thumb and index fingers and found that a specific suppression
of the EEG mu-rhythm. The electroencephalographic mu-rhythm is usually
found in the alpha frequency band over the sensorimotor cortex. It reaches
maximal amplitudes when subjects are at rest and has previously been de-
scribed as being particularly sensitive to sensorimotor events. Suppression
of the resting mu-rhythm indicates that the underlying population of neu-
rons has become desynchronized, which is conceived to reflect an increased
processing load in these neurons (e.g. Kuhlmann, 1978; Pfurtscheller, 1989;
Pfurtscheller, Neuper, Andrew, & Edlinger, 1997).
Muthukumaraswamy and colleagues subsequently reported that this sup-
pression of the human mu-rhythm during action observation and execution
exhibited mirror features that were similar to the findings in monkeys. In
contrasting three different hand actions, mu-desynchronization occurred only
when participants were observing another hand, which was engaged in a pre-
cision grip (as compared to a flat hand movement, cf. Muthukumaraswamy,
Johnson, & McNair, 2004). While desynchronization was particularly pro-
nounced when the grip action was directed towards an object, it was also
found for the observation of intransitive actions, i.e. in the absence of a
graspable object (cf. Muthukumaraswamy & Johnson, 2004).
The finding of desynchronization in response to intransitive actions sug-
gests that the action-observation-execution-matching system in humans has
apparently lost the object specificity, which was assumed to be a defining
property of the monkey mirror system (cf. Press et al., 2008; Umilta` et al.,
2001). Instead, a simpler, somatic matching mechanism has developed, by
which movements can be directly mapped onto the observer’s motor rep-
resentations. Just as a speculative, phenomenological interlude, this might
correspond to the development of self-consciousness that enables humans to
regard their body parts as objects, i.e. to localize them with respect to a
disembodied ”I” that can, for instance, move an arm just like a stick with
the only difference that the arm is miraculously moved by the ”I”. The de-
tachment of mirror mechanisms from the presence of objects can also be
conceived as a huge evolutionary success since it might afford the develop-
ment of a sign-based language system and of course might, since vocal speech
also consists of movements, be crucial for the development of vocal language
as well.
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Ulloa and Pineda (2007) further refined the pattern of findings by report-
ing that mu-suppression could also be found while individuals were viewing
point-light displays of biological motion (kicks and jumping jacks) as com-
pared to scrambled motion. They localized the effect to sources in the sup-
plementary motor area (Cz) and the primary sensorimotor areas (C3, C4).
Their results support the notion that activation of the action-observation-
execution-matching system is sensitive to motion cues in the absence of any
form cues.
Additional support for the existence of an action-observation-execution-
matching system in the human brain comes from MEG experiments. Hari
et al. (1998) used median nerve stimulation to quantify rhythmic neuromag-
netic oscillations in a frequency range between 15 and 25 Hertz as an indicator
for the state of activity of the precentral motor cortex. They found that the
cortical rhythmical activity in the human primary motor cortex was strongly
suppressed during movement execution, but also observed a significant de-
crease in activity during action observation, indicating a desynchronization
and thus increased activation in the primary motor cortex during movement
execution and movement observation.
3.3.3 Neuroimaging
In a recent review of neuroimaging studies, Grafton (2009) has concluded that
the observation of another person performing an action engages a widespread,
bilateral network of cortical brain regions including the bilateral posterior su-
perior temporal sulcus, the inferior parietal lobule, the inferior frontal gyrus,
and the dorsal and ventral premotor cortex. This distributed network for
action observation overlapped strongly with areas associated with movement
execution, in particular areas within the inferior frontal gyrus and the in-
ferior parietal lobule. This overlapping area in the human cortex has been
referred to as a somatotopically organized mirror neuron system (Rizzolatti
& Craighero, 2004). However, at present it is unclear whether this designa-
tion is a functional or a truly anatomical one as no single-cell recordings from
the human brain that unambiguously show the existence of mirror neurons
in the human brain exist. Thus, a functional conception of the mirror neuron
system as a distributed neural network that subserves both, perception and
action, is the current state of the art.
With respect to specific properties of the action-observation-execution-
matching system, neuroimaging studies found increased cerebral blood flow
when participants observed intransitive mouth actions such as silent speech
(Buccino et al., 2004), a finding corresponding to the report of communica-
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tive mirror neurons in the monkey (Ferrari et al., 2003). Furthermore, in
support of the TMS findings by Urgesi et al. (2006), Johnson-Frey et al.
(2003) also found activation of the frontal mirror region in conditions when
individuals were viewing only static pictures of an object being grasped or
touched by a hand. This indicates that the mere observation of an action goal
is sufficient to activate the action-observation-execution-matching system.
3.3.4 Brain Lesions
The few existing lesion studies that allow inferences about the existence of
an action-observation-execution-matching system in the human brain cor-
roborate the findings from electrophysiological and neuroimaging studies.
For instance, studies of patients with limb apraxia, who also showed im-
paired comprehension of observed gestures, point towards the existence of an
anatomical overlap between the neural structures underlying production and
comprehension of gestures (Ferro, Martins, Mariano, & Caldas, 1983; Heil-
man, Rothi, & Valenstein, 1982; Rothi, Heilman, & Watson, 1985). Efforts
to pinpoint the crucial lesion side in these patients also implicated portions
of the inferior frontal gyrus (the opercular and triangularis area; Buxbaum,
Kyle, & Menon, 2005).
Artificial lesions induced by disrupting the activity in specific brain areas
via TMS showed that disrupting activity within the inferior frontal gyrus
impaired weight judgements (Pobric & Hamilton, 2006), whereas repeated
TMS over the ventral premotor cortex slowed reaction times when observed
actions had to be matched (Urgesi, Candidi, Ionta, & Aglioti, 2007).
3.4 Conclusion
Mirror neurons are found in various areas of the monkey brain, where they
constitute a multitude of mirror mechanisms that are embedded within var-
ious neural networks in the brain. According to their location, those mirror
(sub-) systems subserve different cognitive functions. The mirror system,
which consists of parts of the inferior parietal lobule and the ventral premo-
tor cortex, translates sensory representations of observed or heard movements
into motor representations of the same movements, indicating an immediate,
i.e. not cognitively mediated, understanding of sensorily registered motor
behaviour (cf. Fabbri-Destro & Rizzolatti, 2008; Gallese, 2005). In addition,
neurons within the superior temporal sulcus, which are particularly sensi-
tive to actions performed by animate agents, are closely connected to the
parieto-frontal mirror system. Converging findings from studies using a vari-
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ety of experimental paradigms and methodologies support the existence of an
action-observation-execution-matching system in the humans. This system
can be conceived as a functional homologue of the mirror system described
in the monkey brain.

Chapter 4
Organization of the Action-Observation-
Execution-Matching-System
The neurophysiological studies reviewed in the preceding chapter support
the notion that the brain comprises specialized neural circuits for matching
observed actions to sensorimotor representations of the same action in the
observer. Brain areas involved in this neural circuitry were identified within
frontal, parietal, and temporal cortices. This network has been conceived to
afford the internal simulation of observed actions in order to decode those
actions and to assist in inferring or assigning mental states, such as desires,
goals or beliefs to an observed actor. In this chapter, it is proposed that
the action-observation-execution-matching system is hierarchically organized
with different subsystems serving different functions.
4.1 Specialization and Hierarchy
A current prominent idea in cognitive neuroscience is that of a hierarchical or-
ganization of the action-observation-execution-matching system (e.g. Hamil-
ton & Grafton, 2007; Kilner, Friston, & Frith, 2007; Kilner & Frith, 2008).
Hierarchical organization as such is widely recognized in research on motor
control (Keele, Cohen, & Ivry, 1990), perception (Friston & Stephan, 2007;
Robertson & Lamb, 1991), executive functions (Dehaene & Changeux, 1997;
Marcovitch & Zelazo, 2009) or imitation (Wohlschla¨ger, Gattis, & Bekkering,
2003). With respect to the action-observation-execution-matching system,
Hamilton and Grafton (2007), for instance, proposed three broad levels of
description of an action: the goal level, which comprises action outcomes
and behavioural goals; the kinematic level, which refers to the motion of
body parts in space and time; and the muscle level, which describes patterns
of muscle activity. These levels were conceived to be relatively independent
of each other, but related in a hierarchical fashion.
In a series of fMRI experiments, the repression-suppression method was
used to explore the possibility of such a representational hierarchy, which
is associated with different levels of functional anatomy within the action-
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observation-execution network (Hamilton & Grafton, 2006, 2007, 2008). The
repression-suppression method is based on the existence of population coding
within brain regions (e.g. Georgopoulos, Schwartz, & Kettner, 1986) and the
observation of a trialwise reduction in a population’s response to repetitions
of stimulus features that are encoded by this population (cf. Grill-Spector,
Henson, & Martin, 2001).
In the first study (Hamilton & Grafton, 2006), participants observed
grasping actions performed by a human actor, in which either the grasped ob-
ject or the movement trajectory was repeated. A strong repetition-suppression
effect showed up in the left anterior intraparietal sulcus when the same goal
object was grasped repeatedly irrespective of the movement trajectory but
not vice versa. This was taken to support the notion that the goal of an-
other person’s action, at least in terms of the object the person is reaching
for, is encoded within a neural network in the anterior intraparietal sulcus
independent of reach kinematics.
In a follow-up experiment, the type of grasp (precision versus power grip;
Hamilton & Grafton, 2007) was varied in addition to the type of object and
the trajectory of movement. The repetition of grasp type induced suppres-
sion effects in the lateral occipital cortex, which was conceived to provide a
visual analysis of the observed grasp action, as well as in the inferior frontal
gyrus, which was thought to provide a motor analysis of the observed ac-
tion. This interpretation of the latter is in line with the involvement of the
inferior frontal gyrus in judging the weight of a box lifted by another person
(cf. Pobric & Hamilton, 2006). This task has been shown to require the
interpretation of movement kinematics rather than goals (Hamilton, Joyce,
Flanagan, Frith, & Wolpert, 2007). Goal repetition was again associated with
suppression in the anterior intraparietal sulcus. These results clearly demon-
strate dissociable repetition-suppression effects for the inferior frontal gyrus
and the anterior intraparietal sulcus, two regions that have been described
to belong to the action-observation-execution-matching system.
In a second follow-up experiment, movement kinematics and the outcome
of the observed action were manipulated (Hamilton & Grafton, 2008). Con-
sistent with previous observations regarding the repetition of goal objects,
suppression was found in the anterior intraparietal sulcus, though weaker,
for repetitions of action outcomes. The latter mainly induced suppression
within prefrontal (inferior frontal gyrus) and parietal (inferior parietal lob-
ule) areas of the brain, with a significantly stronger effect size in the inferior
parietal lobule. The repetition of grip kinematics induced changes in lateral
occipital areas consistent with the previously described involvement of those
areas in a visual analysis of movement kinematics.
Lestou, Pollick, and Kourtzi (2008) have recently used the repression
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suppression method to explore motor imagery. They had participants men-
tally imitate actions performed by point light figures and found associations
between task goal and parietal activity and task kinematics and premotor ac-
tivity. Interestingly, the superior temporal sulcus was also selectively affected
by repetitions of task goals, which suggests that the processing of biological
motion features is crucial to infer action goals from body movement features.
Their findings can thus be conceived as support for a hierarchical organi-
zation of the action-observation-execution-matching system with a frontal
network responsible for directly matching movement kinematics and a pari-
etal system for matching action goals. Activity within those two networks
could be modulated based on the presence or absence of an animate agent
by inputs from the superior temporal sulcus (cf. Lestou et al., 2008).
In the emerging structure, a neural network comprising areas of the lat-
eral occipital cortex is conceived to be responsible for the visual analysis of
observed actions, whereas the inferior frontal gyrus and the ventral premotor
cortex are assumed to provide a motor analysis of the action. Both net-
works constitute subordinate levels to the representation of the action goal
associated with parietal areas (anterior intraparietal sulcus, inferior parietal
lobule).
4.2 MOSAIC: Modular Selection and Identification for
Control
The above mentioned ideas of specialized matching subsystems and a hier-
archical organization of the action-observation-execution-matching system
nicely relate to computational models of sensorimotor control, which have
been proposed to mediate action understanding at different levels of descrip-
tion. Among the most prominent is the Modular Selection and Identification
for Control model (MOSAIC; Wolpert & Kawato, 1998; Haruno et al., 2001;
Wolpert et al., 2003). Therein, the continuity of perception and action is
conceived to be based on perception-action loops, which have been shown
to constitute elemental building blocks in the nervous system on all levels of
cognitive complexity (cf. Fuster, 2004).
MOSAIC has two core features that are useful in the context of the present
thesis. Firstly, while it was originally formulated as a model of motor control
(Wolpert & Kawato, 1998), it was subsequently extended to comprise a multi-
level control architecture to incorporate aspects of hierarchical motor control
(Haruno et al., 2001) as well as to account for social interactions (Wolpert
et al., 2003). This multilevel control structure features bidirectional commu-
nication between multiple levels of action description. This hierarchical and
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bidirectional control within a multilevel structure nicely relates to the orga-
nization of the action-observation-execution-matching system as described in
the previous section. Secondly, the notion of multiple internal models is well
suited to describe the functional relation between and within the different
subsystems of the action-observation-execution-matching system. Thus, in
the remainder of this section, the MOSAIC model is described and the con-
cept of internal models is introduced. The last section aims to illustrate the
synergies of combining the concepts of MOSAIC with the idea of a distributed
action-observation-execution-matching system.
4.2.1 MOSAIC: The Basics
The MOSAIC model (Wolpert & Kawato, 1998; Haruno et al., 2001; Wolpert
et al., 2003) blossomed from a computational approach to motor control. It
is based on a conception of the motor system as part of a sensorimotor loop,
in which motor commands generate muscle contractions that lead to perceiv-
able sensory feedback, which in turn influences subsequent motor commands
(Wolpert & Ghahramani, 2000). Therein, the human actor is viewed as a
controller that is continuously faced with two tasks: to compute state vari-
ables, which together specify the configuration of the body (e.g., position
and velocity of the limbs or muscle activations), and to determine the cur-
rent context of an action (e.g., object properties or task demands). However,
knowledge regarding the state of the body and the current context is not di-
rectly available to the controller. Instead, the central nervous system (CNS)
has to compute those parameters based on information from the sensory
receptors and the centrally represented knowledge of prior experience.
Problems of Motor Control: Time Delays
These computations are problematic, though. First of all, the transduction
and transport of sensorimotor signals within the CNS requires time. For the
visuomotor loop, Keele and Posner (1968) asserted that the afferent and ef-
ferent delays sum up to 190 to 260 ms before visual feedback can influence
movement accuracy. Subsequent studies, which, for instance, postulated the
existence of an additional fast motion detection system in peripheral regions
of the retina (e.g Paillard, 1996), led to a downward adjustment of this es-
timate. However, the delay has hardly been found to go below 100 ms (for
reviews, see Carlton, 1992; Elliott, Binsted, & Heath, 1999). As a conse-
quence, a centrally generated control signal actually refers to a past state of
the system through delayed peripheral feedback and might not be suitable
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within the current state of the system. Such time delays can be critical be-
cause they can induce phase-shifts between the actual error signal and the
corresponding corrective control signal, which can lead to oscillations in the
feedback loop and subsequent dynamic instabilities. If the delay were to re-
main in the system, only small gains could be applied in the feedback loop,
which would considerably slow down learning and adaptation to changes in
contexts.
Problems of Motor Control: Noise
A further complication for sensorimotor control is the presence of signal-
dependent noise in the system (Harris & Wolpert, 1998; Guigon, Baraduc, &
Desmurget, 2008; Todorov, 2005). On the sensory side it has been shown that
visual noise depends on the position of the object of interest on the retina
in that the standard deviation of that noise is proportional to foveal eccen-
tricity in accordance with Weber’s Law (Burbeck & Yap, 1990; Whitaker &
Latham, 1997). On the motor side a similar relationship has been observed in
that the standard deviation of muscle force linearly increases with the mean
force applied in static (Sutton & Sykes, 1967; Todorov & Jordan, 2002) as
well as dynamic (Schmidt, Zelaznik, Hawkins, Frank, & Quinn, 1979) iso-
metric force tasks. However, the assumption that noise is just a property of
the musculoskeletal plant or the sensory apparatus is biologically implausi-
ble, because signal transduction within the cortex also suffers from internal
noise. Synaptic noise, for instance, is based on the fact that the release of
neurotransmitters into the synaptic cleft is a stochastic process. While it is
possible to achieve reliability of the postsynaptic response in the periphery
by averaging over a large number of transmitter release sites because incom-
ing sensory information is highly redundant, those redundant connections are
rare in the cortex where synaptic connections comprise only a couple of re-
lease sites. This renders communication between cortical neurons unreliable
and noisy (cf. Smetters & Zador, 1996).
Two Types of Internal Models
Based on computational studies that tried to account for noise in sensory
information input and subsequent signal processing as well as considerable
time delays within the sensorimotor loop, it has been proposed that the CNS
internally simulates aspects of the sensorimotor loop in planning, control and
learning (for reviews, see Jordan, 1995; Kawato, 1999; Wolpert, 1997). Those
structures within the CNS have been termed internal models. Those models
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either mimic the input-output relationship of the controlled object (=body)
or their inverses (Kawato, 1999). Thus, they come in two varieties. Forward
models have a body-to-world direction of causality and predict the sensory
consequences from efference copies of issued motor commands with respect
to the current state of the system and the context. Inverse models, on the
other hand, have a world-to-body causality, specifying the necessary motor
commands to bring about desired sensory consequences. Thus, by daisy-
chaining the inverse and the forward model, the system can determine motor
commands to achieve a certain effect in the environment through the inverse
model and also compute the expected sensory feedback based on the motor
commands generated by the inverse model through the forward model.
Modular Organization of Internal Models
However, a single controller would have to be too complex to incorporate
all possible contexts in which movements can occur. Such a general-purpose
controller would have to adjust each time when the context changes. This
would yield large initial performance errors. As an alternative, the MOSAIC
model postulates that the brain contains multiple modules of which each
comprises a pair of forward (=predictor) and inverse (=controller) models.
This modular organization has three advantages (cf. Wolpert & Kawato,
1998; Haruno et al., 2001). Firstly, it affords to organize motor commands
with respect to environmental contexts. Secondly, it minimizes temporal
crosstalk between different sets of motor commands in the course of learning.
Thirdly, it allows to generate novel kinds of behaviour by combining the
output of already existing modules. Thus, in a given context, one or a subset
of inverse models can actively contribute to the control of movement.
Central to MOSAIC is the conception of the responsibility signal, which,
at each point in time, unambiguously specifies to what extent a module
contributes to the dynamical behaviour of the sensorimotor system. This
signal is driven by two processes: A feedforward selection based on sensory
cues and a feedback correction based on the outcome of the movement. In
MOSAIC, multiple predictors are thought to provide predictions of the next
state of the system based on its current state and an efference copy of the
issued motor commands. Those predictions are then compared to the true
outcome. The difference between predicted and actual state specifies the
extent to which a forward model accurately predicts the sensory consequences
of the motor action in the given context. This information is used as a
responsibility signal, which can take values between 0 and 1. Thus, it can
be conceived as the posterior probability of how well each forward model
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correctly captures the current dynamics of the system within its present
context. Within competitive self-supervised learning, the responsibility signal
is used to organize the distribution of error signals among the forward models
(Wolpert & Kawato, 1998).
The inverse model associated with a given forward model receives the de-
sired movement outcome as input and generates a set of motor commands as
output. Learning and adaptation of inverse models is also achieved via the
responsibility signal, which is based on the prediction accuracy of its associ-
ated forward model. The relative contributions of the inverse models to the
dynamic behaviour of the sensorimotor system are specified in the same way
based on the responsibility signal. Thus, if the prediction of a forward model
is very accurate, its associated inverse model will contribute significantly to
the final motor command and both, inverse and forward model, receive strong
error feedback in order to facilitate their adaptation to the current context.
In order to select an adequate module prior to movement initiation solely
based on sensory contextual cues, MOSAIC postulates a third type of model.
This model is called the responsibility predictor. It predicts which model is
most suitable based on prior experience with sensory features of the context,
e.g., the size or (estimated) weight of an object. These predicted responsi-
bility signals can then be compared to the actual responsibilities generated
during movement execution, whereas as the latter were based on the com-
parison between predicted and actual sensory consequences. Finally, these
two responsibility signals, the feedforward estimate of the responsibility pre-
dictor and the feedback signal from the forward model, are combined in a
probabilistic (Bayesian) integration of prior and likelihood (cf. Haruno et al.,
2001).
4.2.2 HMOSAIC: A Hierarchical Extension
An extension of MOSAIC is HMOSAIC (Hierarchical Modular Selection and
Identification for Control; Haruno, Wolpert, & Kawato, 2003). It extends
MOSAIC in that it adds superordinate layers to the model in order to ex-
plain hierarchically organized information-processing and bidirectional com-
munication between different levels of a hierarchy. The basic structure of the
model remains the same. Each layer of HMOSAIC contains a set of mod-
ules as described in MOSAIC. Within the modules in the bottom layer, the
inverse model generates motor commands, the forward model predicts the
sensory consequences of the motor commands, and the responsibility model
produces the posterior probabilities, which indicate how well a given forward
model predicts those consequences in the current context. This responsibility
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signal in terms of the posterior probability of the subordinate modules is sent
via bottom-up connections to the modules on the higher level.
Modules on the higher levels also contain paired inverse and forward mod-
els. Instead of motor commands, these models deal with more abstract as-
pects of an action, such as the order of sequential elements of an action or the
symbolic representation of action goals (cf. Wolpert et al., 2003). As input,
modules on a higher layer receive the posterior probabilities from the modules
of their subordinate layer and an abstract desired behaviour. As an output,
the inverse models of this layer each generate a vector of prior probabilities
for the modules on the lower level to achieve the desired behaviour given the
current state of the system. Its function is thus to assign priority to those
modules on the lower layer whose forward models are deemed to produce the
most accurate predictions at the next point in time. Estimating the posterior
probabilities of the subordinate forward models is the task of the predictive
forward models of this layer. This prediction is, analogously to the lower
level, not only used to weigh the output of the higher-level controllers, but
also to distribute the learning signals for higher inverse and forward models.
In principle, this architecture can be devised to map any level of com-
plexity. In the previously described organization of the action-observation-
execution-matching system, Hamilton and Grafton (2007) suggested three
levels of representation within the action-observation-execution-matching sys-
tem: a muscle level, a kinematic level, and a goal level. The muscle level
corresponds to the lowest level in HMOSAIC, where the distribution of ac-
tivity of elemental modules depends on the specific motor action, but not
on the overall task goal. At the kinematic level, which is implemented as
an intermediate layer in HMOSAIC, specific features of the task are repre-
sented by specific sequences of activation of the modules on the lower level.
These features are not specific for the precise details of movement. On the
goal level, which would be the highest layer of HMOSAIC, the activations
represent the most abstract description of the action, i.e., a specific outcome
or an intention by the actor. This level is not tied to any particular patterns
of muscle activation, or kinematic details.
Haruno et al. (2003) proposed that these distinct layers of an HMOSAIC
architecture are associated with different parts of the cerebellum, which in
turn project to different cortical areas via the thalamus. Among those areas
are regions within the prefrontal, the ventral premotor, and parietal cortices
(cf. Middleton & Strick, 1998), all of which were described to be a part of
the action-observation-execution-matching system. This supports the notion
that the cerebellum has not only motor functions, but also contains predictive
and control modules, which perform computations on various levels of the
action-observation-execution-matching system.
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4.3 Internal Models and the
Action-Observation-Execution-Matching System
With respect to a functional hierarchy within the action-observation-execution-
matching system, Iacoboni and coworkers (Carr, Iacoboni, Dubeau, Mazz-
iotta, & Lenzi, 2003; Iacoboni, 2003) have suggested that mirror-like neurons
in the ventral premotor cortex, the posterior parietal cortex and the supe-
rior temporal sulcus might constitute a biological implementation of a control
scheme such as MOSAIC, which involves forward and inverse models. In their
framework, the superior temporal sulcus provides a visual representation of
observed actions. This neural network within the STS can be extended to
comprise areas within the lateral occipital cortex (cf. Hamilton & Grafton,
2006; Hamilton et al., 2007; Hamilton & Grafton, 2008) and medial tempo-
ral structures, which have also been shown to be sensitive to motion as well
as to the presence of body parts, i.e., biological effectors (Spiridon, Fischl, &
Kanwisher, 2006).
While such an occipito-temporal network is responsible for the visual rep-
resentation of observed actions, connections to the posterior parietal cortex
and onwards to the premotor cortex compose an inverse model, which trans-
forms an (observed) action into a motor plan. This is in line with the findings
by Hamilton and colleagues (2006, 2007, 2008) and Lestou et al. (2008), who
assigned the motor analysis of observed actions to a frontal network, in par-
ticular to the inferior frontal gyrus. Analogously, the backward connection
from the inferior frontal gyrus to the posterior parietal cortex and onward
to the occipito-temporal network serves as a corticocortical implementation
of a forward model that converts the motor plan into a predicted sensory
outcome of the action. Iacoboni (2003) conceived this as a basic mechanism
of imitation according to which actions are observed, then transformed via
the inverse model route into a motor plan, which is subsequently used to per-
form the observed action. Simultaneously, the forward model route is used
to predict the course of action, which can then be compared to the intended
action. This two-way process can also be used for tracking hand movements
performed by conspecifics (Flanagan & Johansson, 2003).
Miall (2003) extended this neural architecture to comprise the cerebel-
lum, which has been conceived to house internal models in its microstructures
(e.g. Ito, 1990, 2008; Wolpert, Miall, & Kawato, 1998), and, as argued above,
has been shown to be connected to various cortical areas within the action-
observation-execution-matching system. Accordingly (Miall, 2003) suggested
to include the projections from the posterior parietal cortex to the cerebel-
lum, which in turn projects to the ventral premotor cortex, in the inverse
route. Accordingly, mirror neurons in the inferior frontal gyrus are conceived
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as motoric representations of observed and executed actions. Those repre-
sentations are activated by inverse models in the cerebellum. For the forward
route, Miall (2003) identifies connections from the premotor and primary mo-
tor cortex to the cerebellum, from which connections lead via the thalamus
back to the posterior parietal cortex. The function of the forward model
that is localized within the cerebellum in this forward route is to update
the visuomotor representation in the posterior parietal cortex based on ef-
ference copies of the motor commands, which are generated in the inferior
frontal gyrus (presumably in the ventral sector of the pars opercularis; cf.
Molnar-Szakacs, Iacoboni, Koski, & Mazziotta, 2005).
Chapter 5
The
Action-Observation-Execution-Matching
System and Perceptuomotor Crosstalk
The assertion of a covert sensorimotor simulation process of observed ac-
tions has straightforward consequences for overt behaviour in that one would
expect systematic crosstalk between perception and action. Accordingly,
the simulation hypothesis has traditionally been examined with experimen-
tal setups that tried to measure interference effects of another person’s limb
posture or action on self-generated actions or, vice versa, the impact of self-
generated movements on the decoding of another person’s actions. At the
centre of this endeavour is the idea of perceptuomotor crosstalk, i.e. the
unintended interference between perception and action within a common
representational substrate. In this chapter, empirical evidence regarding this
type of perceptuomotor crosstalk is reviewed and a functional model of how
perceptuomotor crosstalk within the action-observation-execution-matching
system could work is discussed.
5.1 Behavioural Evidence for the
Action-Observation-Execution-Matching System:
Perceptuomotor Crosstalk
In principle, crosstalk between perception and action can occur in both direc-
tions; from perception to action (motor resonance, for a review, see Rizzolatti
& Craighero, 2004) and from action to perception (perceptual resonance, for
a review, see Schu¨tz-Bosbach & Prinz, 2007). Perceptuomotor crosstalk can
furthermore manifest in two distinct ways, (a) as assimilation by gearing up
the motor system to actually execute the observed movement or facilitating
the perception of environmental features related to action planning, and (b)
as contrast by inhibiting the observed movement within the motor execution
network, or vice versa, by impairing the perception of stimuli related to the
planned or executed action.
37
38 The AOEMS and Perceptuomotor Crosstalk
5.1.1 Perceptuomotor Assimilation
Numerous paradigms have been used to demonstrate facilitative effects of
perception on action and vice versa. Kerzel, Bekkering, Wohlschla¨ger, and
Prinz (2000), for instance, had participants watch two consecutive object
movements and asked them to reproduce the velocity of the first while ignor-
ing the second movement. They found that while participants were able to
reproduce an observed velocity, observation of the second movement invol-
untarily modulated their response in that participants’ reproduction of the
first movement was faster when the velocity of the second target was higher.
Similarly, Castiello, Lusher, Mari, Edwards, and Humphreys (2002) had
participants observe a grasping action directed towards an object, which
could either be large or small. They found that when participants were asked
to subsequently perform an action towards an object of the same size, varia-
tions in cue validity (in terms of the probability that the previously observed
action was directed to an object of same size) systematically affected kine-
matic markers. They found faster reach components (time to peak velocity,
time to peak deceleration) and smaller, i.e. more accurate, grasp apertures
in valid trials, which comprised identical objects for action observation and
execution. Thus, the observation of a matching action facilitated subsequent
action execution. In a follow-up study by Edwards, Humphreys, and Castiello
(2003), in which the cue validity was decreased to 20 percent, the reach and
grasp components of the executed action were found to be primed differen-
tially. Only the reach component was found to exhibit an increased sensitivity
to prior observation of a congruent movement. This finding is in line with
previously reported dissociations of reach and grasp components of prehensile
actions (Jeannerod, 1997). A potential reason for this differential priming ef-
fect according to cue validity is the possibility that only the reach component
is subject to facilitation by an action-observation-execution-matching system
because this component is specified prior to movement initiation during ac-
tion planning. The grasp component, however, remains largely under online
control and is thus not affected by an influence of prime perception on action
planning.
Glenberg and Kaschak (2002) studied the interaction of action percep-
tion and action execution on a more abstract level. They asked participants
to make sensibility judgements to sentences, which implied actions directed
either towards or away from the body by making a response that required
them to move either towards or away of their bodies. They found what they
called an action-sentence compatibility effect, according to which response
times were faster in trials in which the direction of the response movement
and the movement direction implied in the sentence were compatible. Ac-
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cordingly, Zwaan and Taylor (2006) found similar facilitation effects. They
reported shorter response times when sensibility judgements of sentences,
which described manual rotations, were made by same-direction rotations
of the hand (experiment 2), as well as when simultaneously observed visual
rotations were in the same direction as the one described in the sentence.
Reed and Farah (1995) demonstrated that action execution could also
facilitate the perception of action-related visual information. In their study,
participants were asked to detect changes in the arm or leg position of a
human model. At the same time, they were asked to perform arm or leg
movements themselves. Thus, executed and observed motion could refer
to the same or to different limbs. Results showed a priming effect in that
observers more accurately detected position changes in the corresponding
limb condition, which presumably reflected the automatic engagement of
embodied knowledge that directed attention to the corresponding parts of
other viewed bodies during movement execution.
5.1.2 Perceptuomotor Contrast
In accordance with the bidirectionality of perceptuomotor crosstalk, there
have also been numerous demonstrations of decrements in perceptual perfor-
mance caused by action or vice versa. Mu¨sseler and Hommel (1997a), for
instance, found that the identification probability of an arrow pointing left-
or rightward was impaired when the arrow was presented during the execu-
tion phase of a compatible left- or right-button press (more precisely: briefly
before the overt onset of a preplanned response). This action-effect blind-
ness was subsequently reported for a visual detection task as well (Mu¨sseler &
Hommel, 1997b). The authors interpreted this effect as a transient inhibition
of the features which were used for movement execution, and which accord-
ingly were not available for subsequent perception of stimuli comprising the
same features.
Similarly, Hamilton, Wolpert, and Frith (2004) reported a contrastive
influence of active movement on perceptual judgements. In their study, par-
ticipants were required to either lift or hold a box of various weights. Simul-
taneously, they were asked to judge the weight of a box they watched being
lifted by an actor. Results showed that participants systematically judged
the observed box to be lighter when they were lifting or holding a heavy box.
That such perceptuomotor contrast is indeed bidirectional has been demon-
strated by Schubo¨, Aschersleben, and Prinz (2001), as well as Zwickel, Gros-
jean, and Prinz (in press). The former asked participants to draw sinu-
soidal curves on a graphic tablet while observing unrelated sinusoidal stimu-
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lus movements. Besides their finding that observed stimulus motion exerted
a contrastive influence on response movements, they also reported a con-
trast effect in the other direction with movement execution also affecting
stimulus encoding in terms of movement amplitude. Amplitudes of stimulus
motion were perceived to be smaller when larger movement amplitudes had
to be produced. Zwickel et al. (in press) further developed these findings in
demonstrating bidirectionality of perceptuomotor contrast not between, but
within experiments, i.e. with the same task under identical constraints.
With respect to the specificity of perceptuomotor contrast, Jacobs and
Shiffrar (2005) reported that action production interfered with the perception
of similar actions in that observers’ own walking movements on a treadmill
selectively impaired their sensitivity for performing gait speed comparisons of
two point-light walkers. This effect was found to be highly specific in terms
of the performed movement as it was absent when observers were engaged in
other bodily activities such as cycling or standing.
5.2 TEC: The Theory of Event Coding
The Theory of Event Coding (TEC Hommel et al., 2001) is a psychologi-
cal (meta-)theory that integrates conceptual and empirical work inspired by
the ideomotor principle (James, 1890; Greenwald, 1970), the idea of com-
mon coding (Prinz, 1990, 1992, 1997) and the feature-based organization of
visual perception (Singer, 1994) and attention (Treisman & Gelade, 1980)
to account for the bidirectional interactions between perception and action
planning that were described in the previous section. In the following, its
characteristic properties are outlined.
5.2.1 Common Coding
The anatomical separation of afferent and efferent information in the spinal
cord in an ascending dorsal root, which transports sensory signals from the
periphery to the brain, and a descending ventral root, which transports motor
signals from the brain to the periphery, along with the prevalent Cartesian
conception of the reflex arc as the elementary unit of behaviour gave rise
the conception of sensory and motor processes as two distinct properties
of mental life. However, in phenomenal experience, this separation simply
does not exist, as already pointed out by Dewey (1896), who emphasized the
inseparability of sensory stimulus and motor response. He argued that both
constitute necessary parts of a continually reconstituting coordination cycle,
in which perception presupposes and affords active behaviour, and acting
5.2 TEC: The Theory of Event Coding 41
both relies on and generates perceptual information.
According to the idea of common-coding (Prinz, 1990, 1997), this conti-
nuity is not only phenomenal and introspective, but also functional reality
in that late perceptual products and early action precursors share a com-
mon representational medium. Prinz (1992) argued that proximal internal
representations of perceptual objects and action plans, such as patterns of
retinal excitation or of muscular innervation, are not related to each other in
a meaningful way, as sensory excitation is incommensurable with muscular
activation. However, since both refer to events in the environment that are
either perceived by the senses or generated by actions, cognitive representa-
tions for perception and action can be related on a more abstract level with
reference to the informational content of a distal event, which is independent
of the modality-specific encoding of proximal representations. As a conse-
quence, commensurability in the coding of perception and action planning is
achieved by their common reference to perceivable events in the environment.
5.2.2 Ideomotor Principle
While it is easy to see why perceptual codes refer to perceivable events,
Hommel et al. (2001) employed the ideomotor principle to establish this as-
sociation for action planning as well. According to the ideomotor principle,
actions are not caused by stimuli in the environment but by internally rep-
resented goal states and an intention to achieve them (James, 1890; Lotze,
1852). Each time a movement is performed, this movement is necessarily
associated with reafferent consequences of its execution. These consequences
may be resident feelings of the movement itself or remote changes in the
environment that a movement brought about. Through an individual’s con-
tinuous active interaction with the environment, sensorimotor contingencies
are established, which integrate the perceptual consequences of a movement
with the motor neuron activity that generates the movement. Thus, the mere
memory of a resident or remote effect, e.g. a goal state, can trigger the move-
ment that brought about the effect in the past. With repeated execution of
a movement, the remoteness of its contingent effects can be increased, which
affords effect coding in terms of distal events as postulated by the common-
coding view (Prinz, 1992, 1997). Accordingly, those event codes, the core
concepts of TEC (Hommel et al., 2001), are cognitive representations that
do not differentiate between processes of perception or action planning, which
act upon them.
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5.2.3 Three Types of Codes
Representations in general have been conceived to be composites of single
features so that a given representation requires binding, i.e. activation and
integration of features that are distributed across the brain (Singer, 1994;
Treisman & Gelade, 1980). Analogously, TEC postulates that event codes
are composites of feature codes, which represent single aspects of a distal
event. Thus, TEC distinguishes three types of codes. Proximal codes com-
prise sensory and motor codes, which either specify a particular pattern of
sensory stimulation or of motor activation. In contrast, distally defined fea-
ture codes are not specifically tied to a single stimulus or response pattern.
Instead, feature codes comprise abstract information such as the direction
of (stimulus or response) movement. This information can be derived from
sensory codes, i.e. patterns of proximal sensory excitation in different modal-
ities, or can be used to activate various motor codes. Thus, feature codes are
conceived to receive and spread their activation from and to sensory and mo-
tor sources. Feature codes whose activation overlap in time are automatically
integrated into event codes. This process of integration is insensitive to the
temporal succession of distal events, which means that there is no differen-
tiation between cause and effect but blind coactivation. In accordance with
the ideomotor principle, action-effect learning can thus afford effect-action
retrieval.
Furthermore, the idea of feature codes gives rise to the notion of similarity
in terms of the degree to which two event codes share the same feature codes.
This similarity is thus based on an overlapping activation of feature codes that
refer to properties of the stimulus and the action as they occur in the external
world. This overlapping activation can give rise to perceptuomotor crosstalk,
i.e. interactions between the distal internal representations of perceived and
produced events. As described in the preceding section, perceptuomotor
crosstalk can manifest in terms of assimilation and contrast. In TEC, this
division corresponds to the distinction between activation and integration of
feature codes (Hommel et al., 2001). The activation of a feature code primes
all event codes that comprise this particular feature. Thus, the activation of
a feature code during the planning of an action, for instance, automatically
facilitates the perception and the production of other actions that also contain
this particular feature code. Once the active feature codes are integrated in
an event code, assimilation turns into contrast because the integrated feature
codes are no longer available for the formation of another event code.
As actions are controlled by their distal to-be-perceived events, the idea of
an action, no matter if it is due to reading a sentence that describes it, or due
to its mere observation, activates the feature codes that represent the perceiv-
5.2 TEC: The Theory of Event Coding 43
able effects of that action. Those effects are integrated into neural networks
event codes that serve to register and to produce the coded effects. Because
these event codes possess sensorimotor components, activation within the
event code also spreads out to motor codes. As a consequence, each thought
of an action or its observation yields a tendency to execute the action.
5.2.4 Intentional Weighting
According to TEC, event coding is adaptive. In order to afford flexible be-
haviour, which is attuned to a particular situation and the respective goals of
an agent, he or she can adjust the degree to which a particular feature code
contributes to the resulting event code. Thus, preparation to react to a stim-
ulus, for instance, invokes the preactivation of task-relevant feature dimen-
sions such as colour, direction or higher-order abstract features. For the case
of spatial direction, Memelink and Hommel (2005) showed that performing
a task that required stimulus coding in either the horizontal or vertical di-
rection specifically modulated performance in a subsequent two-dimensional
Simon task by increasing the effects of stimulus-response compatibility for the
direction that had been coded previously and decreasing the effects along the
other direction. In another experiment, Wykowska, Schubo¨, and Hommel (in
press) had participants perform grasping or reaching actions and found that
the type of action selectively increased discrimination performance when the
discriminative cue corresponded to a feature dimension that was activated in
the previously executed hand action. Thus, while stimulus observation can
activate feature codes and thereby prime a certain response (as is the case
in many paradigms investigating compatibility effects such as the Simon- or
the Stroop-task), there is also intentional weighting of features codes in that
high-level processes of action planning can affect low-level perceptual pro-
cesses to selectively attend to particular features of the stimulus, which in
turn can affect the specification of action parameters.

Chapter 6
The
Action-Observation-Execution-Matching
System and the Animate-Inanimate
Distinction
6.1 An Argument Based on Relevance and Expertise
With respect to functional specialization within the action-observation-exe-
cution-matching system, Jacob and Jeannerod (2005) postulated a two-sys-
tems-model, which comprised a non-social mirror system in the ventral pre-
motor and the parietal cortex, and a social perception system including the
superior temporal sulcus, the amygdala and the orbito-frontal cortex. While
the task of the former is to detect motor intentions, i.e., intentions directed
towards inanimate objects, the task of the latter is the detection of social in-
tentions directed towards animate agents, especially conspecifics. Recently,
Pierno, Ansuini, and Castiello (2007) have suggested that this separation
might be too strict and have instead argued in favour of a unified system
that codes both motor and social intentions. However, regardless of whether
one postulates a common or two distinct subsystems serving sensorimotor
simulation, what can be retained from Jacob and Jeannerod (2005) is the
idea that sensorimotor simulation within the action-observation-execution-
matching-system could be particularly sensitive to the observation of actions
performed by animate agents.
There are several good reasons why activity of the action-observation-
execution-matching system should be specifically sensitive to biological, i.e.,
animate movements. In support of this, the two naive notions of relevance
and expertise, which were already mentioned in the introduction, are recon-
sidered.
With reference to the notion of relevance, according to which the action-
observation-execution-matching system is particularly sensitive to bodily ac-
tions since bodies of animate beings are the conduit of social interaction, it
is generally accepted that humans and animals have mental states, such as
desires or goals. Even though mentalizing can easily be transferred to the
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perception of object motion (e.g Heider, 1944; Heider & Simmel, 1944), it
is generally assumed that machines and inanimate objects do not possess
those states. If a function of the action-observation-execution-matching sys-
tem, amongst other things, is to support inferences about mental states to
allow for social interaction, activation of the action-observation-execution-
matching system by inanimate motion could be maladaptive in that it leads
to false attributions of mental states (cf. Press, Bird, Flach, & Heyes, 2005)
and therefore should be sensitive to the animacy of objects of interaction.
According to the notion of expertise, animate actions are specifically po-
tent in activating the action-observation-execution-matching system because
observed and produced kinematics can directly be mapped onto each other. It
has been shown that activation of the action-observation-execution-matching
system is stronger during the observation and presumably during the sim-
ulation of movements that are physically familiar. Aglioti, Cesari, Romani,
and Urgesi (2008), for instance, have recently reported increased accuracy in
predicting the outcome of basketball throws by professional basketball play-
ers as compared to sports journalists, who were conceived to possess visual
expertise on judging free throws, but not the motor competence the play-
ers possessed. Moreover, TMS application in the basketball players showed
sensorimotor involvement in action observation. Since humans are experts
in performing biological actions, observation of these should lead to stronger
activations in the action-observation-execution-matching system.
Thus, in the following, neurophysiological and behavioural studies that
specifically compared the responsiveness of the action-observation-execution-
matching system for actions performed by animate agents and inanimate
objects are reviewed.
6.2 Empirical Evidence for Biological Tuning of the
Action-Observation-Execution-Matching System
6.2.1 Neurophysiological Studies
First evidence for biological tuning of the action-observation-execution-mat-
ching system comes from the seminal paper by Gallese et al. (1996). They
reported that the matching of observed and executed actions in mirror neu-
rons is highly specific, in that it not only refers to the action but also to how
it is executed. In their taxonomy of mirror neurons, they grouped mirror
neurons according to the hand action effective in activating them. One of
those subgroups called manipulating neurons was found to discharge when
an experimenter touched and retrieved an object, but only if he did so with
his fingers. The neurons remained silent when the experimenter obtained the
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object with a tool. Additionally, efforts to elicit discharges in other subgroups
by using objects or tools to imitate the respective actions also failed. This
has been taken to suggest that manipulating mirror neurons are sensitive for
the presence of a biological effector.
Studying humans, Cochin, Barthelemy, Lejeune, Roux, and Martineau
(1998) used quantified electroencephalography (qEEG) to compare cortical
activity during the observation of human and object motion. They discov-
ered a desynchronization of the EEG pattern in the precentral motor cortex
specifically during the observation of human motion. A subsequent study
by Martineau and Cochin (2003) with children (two to eight years of age)
who watched human, animal, and virtual movements confirmed the differen-
tial activation according to the observed movement. Most interestingly, they
incorporated an additional distinction between real and virtual body move-
ments in their experimental design (observing a young person performing
scissor movement with his/her legs while lying on the back versus a snippet
of a Walt Disney cartoon showing Cinderella dancing with the prince). They
identified a network within centro-parietal areas of the left hemisphere during
the perception of the young person and Cinderella, which was absent during
the perception of animal motion. Based on their findings, Martineau and
Cochin (2003) concluded that the observation of human action, regardless
of being performed by a real person or a comic character, elicited activa-
tion within a cortical network specifically tuned to movements performed by
human agents.
This assumption of an equivalence of virtual and real human actions is
implicitly assumed in many studies of visuomotor coordination (e.g Decety
et al., 1994; Ghahramani & Wolpert, 1997). Perani et al. (2001) exam-
ined this assumption of equivalence in adults. They had participants watch
object-grasping actions performed by a real right hand compared to a virtual-
reality reconstruction with either high (with biological texture and shape) or
low (only biological shape) virtual-reality level. While they found common
activations in areas specialized in the processing of motion information (early
visual areas and area MT; e.g. Buchel & Friston, 1997; Watson et al., 1993),
and sensorimotor control (posterior parietal cortex; e.g. Andersen, Snyder,
Bradley, & Xing, 1997; Milner & Goodale, 1995), they found selective acti-
vations for the observation of real actions in the right inferior parietal cortex.
Perani et al. (2001) concluded that only real actions activate parietal areas
that provide nonretinocentric coordinates in an egocentric frame of reference,
which can be used for motor planning (cf. Willingham, 1998). This egocen-
tric visuospatial representation might be a prerequisite for a direct-matching
mechanisms mediating the internal simulation of observed actions within
the action-observation-execution-matching system. This suggests that only
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perception of actions by a real hand can be mapped onto existing action rep-
resentations, whereas virtual-reality conditions do not access the full-motor
knowledge available to the central nervous system.
Tai, Scherfler, Brooks, Sawamoto, and Castiello (2004) conducted the
first neuroimaging study that demonstrated a similar preference for biolog-
ical agents of a neuronal population within the human premotor cortex. In
showing grasping actions to participants placed in a PET scanner, they com-
pared grasping performed by a human to a robot model performing the same
actions. They found activation in the left ventral premotor cortex only in the
presence of the human model. They concluded that only observing a biologi-
cal effector activates a matching mechanism that maps the observed action to
the observer’s motor representations. While in the monkey study by Gallese
et al. (1996), the action of a tool grasping an object might simply not be a
part of the behavioural repertoire of the monkey and might account for the
absence of cortical matching in the premotor cortex between the observed
action and the internal motor commands, this reasoning is difficult to uphold
for a human model observing a robot arm, since grasping is definitely part of
a human’s motor repertoire. Alternatively, Tai et al. (2004) suggested that
the mismatch of perceptual information in terms of movement kinematics ex-
plained the differential pattern of activation because movements performed
by the robot arm lacked the typical smoothness of human motion.
However, the idea of biological tuning of the action-observation-execution-
matching system is controversially discussed in neuroscience. One of the ex-
periments in study by Nelissen et al. (2005), which was described in chapter
3.2, did also comprise a comparison of fMRI scans of monkeys who were
watching videos of grasping actions performed by a human to the same ac-
tions performed by a robot hand (experiment 3). Similar to the results by Tai
et al. (2004), they found a significantly larger increase in cerebral bloodflow
in the anterior sector of the ventral premotor cortex during the observation of
grasping actions performed by the human model in comparison to grasping
actions performed by the robot. However, with respect to a neutral base-
line, the observation of the robot action also led to a significant increase in
activation. This indicates that even though activation of the monkey mirror
system is apparently more pronounced during the observation of a human
model, actions performed by a robot model also have the ability to trigger
activation of the monkey mirror system.
A study by Oberman, McCleery, Ramachandran, and Pineda (2007) ex-
amined human participants in a similar task. They used EEG to measure
mu-suppression during the observation of transitive and intransitive grasping
actions performed by a robot hand with human form characteristics, i.e., four
fingers and an opposable thumb. They found mu-suppression, which has been
6.2 Empirical Evidence for Biological Tuning 49
conceived to reflect activation of the action-observation-execution-matching
system in humans, during the observation of both transitive and intransitive
grasping actions by the robot.
Gazzola, Rizzolatti, Wicker, and Keysers (2007) criticized the study by
Tai et al. (2004) by arguing that the authors did not properly control the
amount of movement variability between robot and human motion, which
rendered it impossible to attribute the results on differences in movement
kinematics and action variability. Of course, it could be argued that these
two explanations are by no means exclusive since movement variability is an
essential feature of biological kinematics. In their study, Gazzola et al. (2007)
used fMRI to measure brain activation during the observation of four different
stimulus displays, which depicted a rest condition, an intransitive motion, a
simple grasping action (picking up an object), and a complex action (placing
a lid on a jar). Their results revealed equivalent neural responses to the
observation of goal-directed human as well as robotic grasping actions in brain
regions involved in the execution of similar actions, i.e. in temporal, premotor
and parietal brain regions. Gazzola et al. (2007) argued that the diverging
results reported by Tai et al. (2004) were due to the repeated presentation
of identical stimuli of the robotic movement, which led to habituation within
the action-observation-execution-matching system (see also chapter 4.1, on
the repetition-suppression effects reported by Hamilton & Grafton, 2006;
Hamilton et al., 2007; Hamilton & Grafton, 2008). However, contrary to
the findings by Nelissen et al. (2005) and Oberman et al. (2007), they
only found a weak activation of the action-observation-execution-matching
system during the observation of intransitive actions, as compared to actions
that involved object manipulation. However, they reported that, while no
differential activation of the action-observation-execution-matching system
was found during the observation of a complex action, there was a larger
activation in response to simple actions that were performed by the human
model.
6.2.2 Behavioural Studies
That the presence of a human body might be functionally relevant for the
influence of action execution on action perception has been shown by Flana-
gan and Johansson (2003). In their study, participants had to perform and
observe a block-stacking task. Their eye movements were recorded simulta-
neously. Flanagan and Johansson (2003) found that almost all gaze fixations
in the execution condition were directed towards the grasp locations of the
blocks that had to be lifted and the landing location where the blocks had to
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be placed. Subsequent timing analysis revealed that gaze behaviour was pre-
dictive rather than reactive in that gaze preceded the actual hand movement
towards the respective location by 150 ms. In the observation condition, the
coordination between participants’ gaze and the observed actor’s hand was
highly similar to the pattern observed in gaze-hand coordination when they
were required to perform the task themselves. Again, gaze behaviour was
found to be anticipatory as it preceded the hand movements of the actor.
The authors also employed an additional experimental condition, in which
participants observed block-stacking movements without actually seeing the
actor who performed the movements. While the pattern of gaze behaviour
was found to be similar to actual movement execution and observation with
the human model present, the anticipatory nature of gaze control vanished
in the absence of the human model. This indicates that the mere presence
of the object manipulation is not sufficient to trigger the action-observation-
execution-matching system, but requires the presence of the human actor.
Thus, the human body had to be present for prediction to occur.
In the study by Castiello et al. (2002), which showed a priming ef-
fect of observed grasping actions to subsequent action execution (see chap-
ter 5.1), this effect was not found when subjects were viewing a robotic
hand/arm model performing the grasping movement. This supports the no-
tion of biological specificity of the action-observation-execution-matching sys-
tem. However, visuomotor priming was also absent when the observed model
was blindfolded during movement production and thus its movement kine-
matics for large and small objects did not differ. The differential effect of
visuomotor priming for a human as compared to a robotic hand reported
by Castiello et al. (2002) might not truly reflect biological tuning of the
action-observation-execution-matching system, but rather be the result of
the presence of discriminative kinematic cues, which allow the preactivation
of different grasping actions without reference to biological features of the
observed actions.
Other studies provided more direct evidence with respect to the animate-
inanimate distinction within the action-observation-execution-matching sys-
tem. In a series of experiments, Brass and colleagues (Brass, Bekkering,
Wohlschla¨ger, & Prinz, 2000; Brass, Bekkering, & Prinz, 2001) used a stimulus-
response-compatibility paradigm to assess the influence of observed finger
movements as compared to symbolic and spatial cues on visuomotor priming
of manual actions. Observation of a finger movement strongly affected sub-
sequent movement execution, irrespective of whether the finger movement
was the relevant or irrelevant stimulus dimension (cf. Brass et al., 2000).
Reaction times to observed finger movements were faster than reaction times
in response to symbolic or spatial stimuli. In the latter two conditions, in
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which observed finger movements were task-irrelevant, they nevertheless sig-
nificantly interfered with movement execution in incongruent and facilitated
movement execution in congruent trials as compared to a baseline condition.
A similar interference was not observed when spatial or symbolic cues were
used as irrelevant stimuli. Similarly, Brass et al. (2001) also reported a
compatibility effect that was found to depend on the type of moving object.
While the observation of finger movements elicited significant compatibility
effects on pre-instructed finger movements, compatibility effects were only
marginally significant when responses were triggered by moving squares. The
squares represented the position of the finger tip and thus did not differ in
terms of kinematics or amplitude from the finger movements.
However, analogous to the neurophysiological findings by Gazzola et al.
(2007) and Oberman et al. (2007), there also exist behavioural studies that
propose that the action-observation-execution-matching system can also be
activated by artificial stimuli. Press et al. (2005), for instance, reported
response compatibility effects for observing both human and robot hands. In
their study, they showed participants either naturalistic or schematic pho-
tographic images of a human or a robot hand in a terminal posture, either
depicting an open or a closed hand. Those images could be compatible or in-
compatible with the subsequent response. Results showed that both stimulus
types could elicit automatic priming supporting the notion of stimulus gen-
eralization as postulated by associative learning accounts (e.g. Heyes, 2001;
Heyes, Bird, Johnson, & Haggard, 2005; Keysers & Perrett, 2004). How-
ever, the finding that human stimuli, naturalistic and schematic, are more
powerful visuomotor primes than the respective robot hand stimuli indicates
that the observation of animate stimuli is more closely related to action ex-
ecution and affords a more direct matching. Since the schematic stimuli
differed only in shape, the observed stronger activation of a human hand im-
plies that other cues such as kinematics, texture, or size is not necessary to
produce differential activation of the action-observation-execution-matching
system. Accordingly, the compatibility effect was further pronounced when
the robotic hand was visually more similar to the human hand stimuli (Press,
Gillmeister, & Heyes, 2006).
The above mentioned examples all used discrete responses to show that
the observation of actions performed by an animate agent specifically affected
response execution. However, Kilner, Paulignan, and Blakemore (2003) em-
ployed a continuous movement execution and observation paradigm, which
showed that perceptuomotor crosstalk is apparently sensitive to the animate-
inanimate distinction. In their study, they found specific interference in
movement production while participants were simultaneously observing in-
congruent movements made by a human model in contrast to movements by
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a robot model. The observation of continuous oscillatory arm movements by
a human model led to significantly greater variance in the position of the
participants’ fingertip N˜ i.e. greater vertical position variance for horizontal
movements and vice versa N˜ in incongruent trials, in which the movement
plane of the participant was perpendicular to the movement plane of the ob-
served model. Later, Blakemore and Frith (2005) argued that this was due
to the assimilation of the observed model motion into the ongoing movement
via an automatically induced activation of the observed movement.
6.3 What Triggers Activation of the
Action-Observation-Execution-Matching System in
Response to Animate Action?
The preceding review of the literature suggests that there exist specific re-
sponses to animate stimuli in terms of an increased activation of brain areas
that are conceived to be part of the action-observation-execution-matching
system. Similar results were found in terms of perceptuomotor crosstalk in
overt behaviour. The finding that in some studies artificial effectors such
as robot hands or moving dots were also able to elicit crosstalk on both the
neural and the behavioural level does not necessarily invalidate the claim of a
particular sensitivity of the action-observation-execution-matching system to
animate actions, especially if one assumes a hierarchically organized system,
in which movement kinematics, goals, and even more abstract features such
as intentions can be mapped.
Accordingly, recent theoretical work on imitation and social cognition
has converged on an associative account of an action-observation-execution-
matching system, in which perceptuomotor crosstalk and ultimately sensori-
motor simulation is based on individual experience of contingencies between
perception and action and possesses the potential for generalization (e.g.
Heyes, 2001; Heyes et al., 2005; Keysers & Perrett, 2004). If actions per-
formed by inanimate objects such as a robot hand closely resembled human
movements, e.g., by way of shared surface/form features or movement kine-
matics, activation within the action-observation-execution-matching system
would occur in terms of overt perceptuomotor crosstalk. Thus, the appro-
priate question to ask is not if the action-observation-execution-matching
system is particularly sensitive to the animacy of a stimulus, but rather
which stimulus features define animacy as a trigger for the action-observation-
execution-matching system.
According to Cutting (1981), one of the most fruitful ideas in cognitive
psychology has been the idea of underlying structures. Structures contain
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two types of elements: variants and invariants. While variants are inconstant
across multiple situations, invariants remain constant across every instantia-
tion of an event. Although variants are mainly the source of the experiential
diversion in a wide range of events, the invariants will certainly be most use-
ful for propagating advances in the scientific study of perception and action.
The invariants in an event structure were classified by Ko¨hler (1947). He dis-
tinguished between topographic and dynamic invariants. While the former
refer to structural relations in space, i.e., the structural properties in static
images of an event, the latter are conceived as structural relations in time,
i.e., as the rules that govern the nature of change over the course of an event.
An important invariant in biological movement trajectories is the two-
thirds-power law (Lacquaniti, Terzuolo, & Viviani, 1983). It is an empirical
law, which governs voluntary upper-limb movements. It postulates an inverse
non-linear relationship between the tangential velocity of the hand and the
curvature of its trajectory. Within an elliptic movement trajectory, for in-
stance, there are segments with low curvature in the middle of the ellipse, and,
segments with large curvature at the turning points of the trajectory. While
performing such a movement, one has to slow down as curvature increases
and can speed up as curvature decreases. The amount of deceleration and ac-
celeration is proportional to the change in curvature raised to the 2/3 power.
Viviani and Monoud (1990) showed that individuals are unable to generate
hand movements that violated the velocity-curvature covariation specified in
the two-thirds power law even after extensive training under visual guidance.
Furthermore, the power law has been demonstrated to hold for perception
as well. Viviani and Stucchi (1992) showed that people judge the observed
motion of a single light-point stimulus to move with constant velocity when
it actually accelerated and decelerated on an elliptical movement trajectory
in accordance with the power law. Moreover, Kandel, Orliaguet, and Viviani
(2000) showed that people’s ability to predict a letter that is about to be
traced critically depends on whether the movement of the previous letter
corresponded to the two-thirds-power law. Based on these observations, Vi-
viani (2002) argued that the velocity-curvature covariation specified in the
two-thirds power law ”is a kind of signature that can be used to tell rather
reliably what is biological and what is not” (p. 416).
With respect to the topographical invariants of biological motion, evi-
dence for a particular sensitivity of the action-observation-execution-matching
system for animate action comes from research on apparent motion (e.g.
Shiffrar & Freyd, 1990, 1993; Heptulla-Chatterjee, Freyd, & Shiffrar, 1996).
Apparent motion refers to the perception of movement when two spatially
separated, stationary objects are presented in close temporal succession.
When those two objects are simple light points and have identical shapes,
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apparent motion follows the shortest path possible (Korte, 1915; Wertheimer,
1912). Shiffrar and Freyd (1990), however, showed that when participants
saw pictures of different body postures instead of inanimate objects, the per-
ception of the apparent path of motion was modulated by the presence of a
human body. When the time interval between the presentation of two succes-
sive pictures was small, the shortest path between two postures is perceived,
even though it might be physiologically impossible. With longer time inter-
vals, however, only biomechanically possible paths of motion are perceived.
It was concluded that observers are apparently sensitive to the biomechani-
cal properties of the human body and that knowledge about these properties
is automatically activated in the presence of human bodies in the stimulus
display.
Consequently, it should be possible to discriminate biological from non-
biological motion based on the kinematics of a single-point light, whose mo-
tion is mapped on one’s own motor apparatus, as well as based on the pres-
ence of a human body, which automatically activates embodied knowledge
regarding the observed course of action. In principle, both kinds of stim-
ulus features should be able to trigger activation of the action-observation-
execution-matching system, given that it is particularly sensitive to animate
actions.
Such a dual activation of the action-observation-execution-matching sys-
tem based on topographic and dynamic stimulus properties corresponds to
a differentiation within the occipito-temporal network, which was previously
distinguished as a part of the action-observation-execution-matching system,
whose task is to provide a purely visual analysis of observed actions (see
chapter 4.1). This network comprises areas that are particularly responsive
to the observation of biological motion (superior temporal sulcus, e.g. Gross-
man et al., 2000; Grossman & Blake, 2001) as well as to the presence of
features of biological form (lateral fusiform gyrus, e.g. Spiridon et al., 2006).
The contributions of these areas are integrated within the network to achieve
a unified representation of the visual stimulus with respect to its animacy.
This provides neurophysiological support for the notion that the distinction
between animate and inanimate stimuli can be made based on the presence
of both topographic and dynamic invariants in the visual signal.
With reference to the findings of a specific interference effect for biological
motion by Kilner et al. (2003), a couple of studies were conducted that
aimed to elucidate how this effect is generated. In such a follow-up study,
Kilner, Hamilton, and Blakemore (2007) used a paradigm similar to the first
study, but this time, participants were shown human and object motion
that could either follow a biological (acceleration and deceleration phases
according to minimum-jerk) or a non-biological (constant velocity) velocity
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profile. They found larger orthogonal variability in incongruent trials than
in congruent trials when participants performed oscillatory linear movements
during the observation of movements with a biological velocity profile. The
effect was independent of the type of stimulus (object vs. human model).
They concluded that biological kinematics in terms of the velocity profile
were crucial for specific perceptuomotor crosstalk in response to animate
stimuli to occur.
A study by Bouquet, Gaurier, Shipley, Toussaint, and Blandin (2007)
aimed to replicate the original effect reported by Kilner et al. (2003) and
also compared biological and non-biological velocity profiles of dot motion
with respect to the effect. In their first experiment, in which they tested
whether a video display of a human model yielded the same effects as the
observation of an actual human model, they did indeed find a congruency
effect with increased variance along the orthogonal spatial axis for incongru-
ent movements. However, this effect cannot unambiguously be attributed
to the observation of a human model, since they did not include a control
condition that depicted an inanimate stimulus. In their second experiment,
they showed participants dot movements that either moved with biological
or non-biological kinematics. Here, they found a specific increase in move-
ment variance when participants simultaneously observed dot motion with a
biological velocity profile. They also found a significant main effect of con-
gruency with observation of incongruent perpendicular movements, which
led to higher orthogonal variance. However, the interaction between type of
motion and congruency did not approach significance at all, F < 1, so that
the observed effects cannot be taken as evidence for specific perceptuomotor
crosstalk due to the observation of biological movements (only).
By using a similar paradigm, Stanley, Gowen, and Miall (2007) also com-
pared perceptuomotor crosstalk during the execution of linear oscillatory
movements and simultaneous observation of dot movements. Similar to the
studies by Kilner et al. (2003) and Bouquet et al. (2007), both stimulus
and response movements were either horizontal or vertical. Furthermore,
dot movements either followed a biologically plausible or implausible veloc-
ity profile. They found that the presentation of an incongruent dot stimulus
did not produce specific effects of perceptuomotor crosstalk when partici-
pants had been told that the dot motion was computer generated. Crosstalk
in terms of increased orthogonal variance was observed only when partici-
pants were told that dot motion represented the movement trajectory of a
human agent, irrespective of the motion’s velocity profile. Based on these
effects, the relevance of inferred agency and the lack of impact of the velocity
profile, Stanley et al. (2007) concluded that the interference effect reflected
a top-down modulation of perceptual input without reference to the actual
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movement kinematics.
Thus, at present it is unclear which stimulus features actually trigger
perceptuomotor crosstalk, which is specific to the observation of actions per-
formed by animate agents. Based on the conceptual distinctions by Cutting
(1981) and Ko¨hler (1947), and the empirical work described in the previous
chapter, the general purpose of the present study was to explore the effects
of the presence of topographic and dynamic invariants that indicate animacy
of an observed action on perceptuomotor crosstalk during the simultaneous
observation and execution of intransitive actions. Therefore, biological kine-
matics (= dynamic invariants) and surface/form features of a human body
(= topographic invariants) were either present or absent in the stimulus dis-
play in order to measure their relative contribution to interactions between
simultaneous perception and action.
Chapter 7
The Experiments: General Aspects
7.1 Task
For the present study, intransitive continuous oscillatory right-left and up-
down movements were selected as actions that should be observed and simul-
taneously executed by the participants. It was assumed that the presence of
an object would not be necessary to activate the human action-observation-
execution-matching system. While this assumption is firmly grounded on
empirical evidence regarding intransitive actions as described in previous
chapters (e.g. Fadiga et al., 1995; Press et al., 2008), there are several
methodological reasons not to use transitive, object-directed actions in the
context of the present study.
Firstly, it has was shown that the mere presentation of an object can
induce a motor response that is afforded by the object (Castiello, 2003;
Craighero, Fadiga, Umilta`, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Tucker & Ellis, 1998). Castiello
(2003), for instance, showed that the prior observation of a graspable object
can prime its respective goal representation, which in turn activates features
of the associated action. Consequently, if one is interested in investigating
the properties of the action-observation-execution-matching system, one will
have to use intransitive actions in order to avoid confounding activity from
an affordance-based canonical network (cf. 3.1).
Secondly, the action-observation-execution-matching system was shown
to be particularly sensitive to intransitive actions. Buccino et al. (2004)
compared cerebral blood flow when participants were watching mouth actions
performed by a human, a monkey or a dog. These actions were either object-
oriented (= transitive), such as biting a piece of food, or communicative (=
intransitive), such as human silent speech, dog barking, or lip smacking by the
monkey. They found activation of the action-observation-execution-matching
system within the posterior parietal and ventral premotor cortex during all
biting (= transitive) actions, but activation within the premotor sector of
Broca’s area only for intransitive actions that belonged to the human motor
repertoire, i.e., silent speech and lip-smacking.
Besides its intransitivity, the present task has two additional advantages.
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First, to perform oscillatory back-and-forth-movements should be easy for
the participants. This is important since previous research implicated that
perceptuomotor crosstalk depends on the level of expertise at performing
the observed action (Calvo-Merino, Glaser, Gre`zes, Passingham, & Haggard,
2005; Repp & Knoblich, 2004; Aglioti et al., 2008). The use of simple contin-
uous arm movements with no novel demands to sensorimotor expertise should
minimize interindividual differences in activation of the action-observation-
execution-matching system due to differences in sensorimotor competence.
Furthermore, the present task comprised no particularly salient action
goal. Goals as such do not exist in the objective world. There are only
internally represented goal states, the external world, and the individual’s
relation to the world, which all possess a certain value for the organism (cf.
Gallese & Metzinger, 2003). As such, action goals are always subject to
interpretations on the part of the actor. These interpretations might differ
between individuals. As a consequence, it was tried to minimize the influence
of interindividual differences in the interpretation of an action goal on the
activity within the action-observation-execution-matching system.
Consequently, the usage of intransitive, simple actions, such as oscil-
latory back-and-forth-movements, should prevent differential value assign-
ments with respect to the task goal as well as confounding activation of
an object-related canonical neural network outside the action-observation-
execution-matching system. Furthermore, no expertise effects should be ex-
pected to emerge from such a task.
7.2 Paradigm
In the present set of experiments, movement direction was chosen as the
feature that stimulus (observed motion) and response (executed movement)
shared, i.e., that was a feature of both stimulus and response. This was done
because, on the one hand, movement direction has been shown to be an im-
portant movement parameter that is encoded in the central nervous system
as a major determinant in both movement execution (e.g. Georgopoulos,
Kalaska, Caminiti, & Massey, 1982; Schwartz, Kettner, & Georgopoulos,
1988; Vindras & Viviani, 2002) and motion perception (e.g. Camisa, Blake,
& Levinson, 1977; Dobkins & Teller, 1996; Levinson & Sekuler, 1975). On
the other hand, it has frequently been employed as the overlapping stimu-
lus/response dimension in studies investigating perception-perception (e.g.
Jazayeri & Movshon, 2007; Marshak & Sekuler, 1979; Raymond & Isaak,
1998), perception-action (Bouquet et al., 2007; Grosjean, Zwickel, & Prinz,
2008; Kilner et al., 2007, 2003; Zwickel et al., 2007), and action-action in-
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Figure 7.1: The experimental paradigm employed in Experiment 1 and with slight mod-
ifications also in the subsequent Experiments 2-4. For a more detailed description, see the
Methods section of Experiment 1.
teractions (Heuer & Klein, 2006; Heuer, Kleinsorge, & Klein, 2007; Swinnen
et al., 1998).
The basic structure of the experimental paradigm is illustrated in Figure
7.1. Based on the aforementioned consideration, the task of the participants
was to perform continuous oscillatory movements in temporal synchrony with
the stimulus’ motion, but to ignore the orientation of motion presented on
the screen. Thus, the orientation of motion was the dimension that could
give rise to perceptuomotor crosstalk, but was not the dimension critical for
task performance. More specifically, stimulus orientation in space was irrel-
evant for response execution, whereas the timing of the observed stimulus
was the only relevant stimulus features. Thus, as far as the participants’
understanding of the task was concerned, there was no reason for the move-
ment orientation of the stimulus to influence the movement orientation of the
participants’ response.
The experimental manipulations comprised four factors:
1. Biological topography: type of stimulus. In order to assess the impact
of biological surface/form features on interactions between perception
and action, the observed oscillatory movements were either performed
by a human model or a ball-like object.
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2. Biological kinematics: mode of presentation. Biological kinematics
could either be present or absent in the stimulus display. In the dynamic
display condition, participants saw a film depicting actual movements.
In the static display condition, participants only saw still pictures that
represented the positions of the hand or the object at the turning points
of their oscillatory movements. Even though the static display did not
comprise actual motion, both displays are referred to as motion displays
in the following chapters.
3. Response orientation. Participants were required to perform oscillatory
movements that could either be horizontally or vertically oriented.
4. Congruency of stimulus motion. The observed orientation of continu-
ous or implied motion could either be the same (= congruent) as or
orthogonal (= incongruent) to the orientation of the required response
movement.
Chapter 8
Experiment 1: Selection and Execution
8.1 Introduction
The purpose of the first experiment was twofold. Firstly, it should be exam-
ined whether perceptuomotor crosstalk is differentially sensitive to static and
dynamic perceptual cues that indicate animacy of the stimulus. Secondly, it
was sought to determine if and how such crosstalk affects response selection
and movement execution.
To this end, various stimulus displays were generated that did or did not
comprise biological kinematics and bodily topographics. In order to exam-
ine how the orientation of an observed stimulus affects processes of response
selection, a two-alternative forced-choice procedure was employed. Choice-
reaction times have previously been used to show that response selection
depends on the spatial relationship between stimulus and response, even in
cases, in which this relationship is irrelevant to the task at hand. This so-
called Simon effect has mostly been studied with stationary stimuli that were
mapped to discrete motor responses (for reviews, see Simon, 1990; Lu & Proc-
tor, 1995), but has also been extended to dynamic stimuli (Ehrenstein, 1994;
Michaels, 1988; Proctor, Zandt, Lu, & Weeks, 1993; Stu¨rmer, Aschersleben,
& Prinz, 2000).
After the initial choice-reaction-time task, participants had to continu-
ously perform cyclical oscillatory movements in temporal synchrony with the
stimulus display. During this phase, visuomotor performance was measured
in order to assess emerging perceptuomotor crosstalk during movement exe-
cution.
8.2 Methods
8.2.1 Participants
Sixteen students of the University of Dortmund, nine men and seven women,
participated in the experiment. They were 18 to 28 years old (mean: 23.1
years; SD: 3.3 years). In this experiment as well as in all subsequent ones,
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all participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision with normal
colour vision according to the Ishihara test (Ishihara, 2005). Each individual
had given informed consent prior to the start of the experiment, which was
done in accordance with the ethical standards laid down in the 1964 Dec-
laration of Helsinki. The participants received 10 euros or course credit for
their participation.
8.2.2 Apparatus
The experiment was conducted in a completely darkened room. Participants
stood upright facing a 20-inch LCD monitor, which was positioned in front
of them on eye level at a distance of about 100 cm. In order to record
finger movement trajectories, a sensor of a miniBIRD system (miniBIRD 800,
Ascension Technology Corporation) was attached to their right index finger
directly above their finger nail. The position of the sensor was recorded at
103.6 Hz (spatial resolution: 0.11 mm) in three dimensions (x,y,z) with the
x dimension corresponding to horizontal movements of the participants and
the z dimension corresponding to vertical movements. Stimulus presentation
was controlled by an IBM-compatible microcomputer using MATLAB and
the Psychophysics Toolbox extension (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). Data
collection via the miniBIRD was controlled by a separate computer. The
computers were synchronized using the TCP/UDP protocol implemented in
MATLAB via the TCP/UDP/IP Toolbox extension (Rydesaeter, 2001).
8.2.3 Stimuli
For the animate stimuli, a male human model (the author), dressed in black
and standing upright in front of a neutral, white background, was filmed with
a digital video camera (JVC GR-DVL100E, frame rate 25 Hz). Facing the
camera, the model performed cyclical oscillatory movements with the whole
right arm for about 30 seconds in either the vertical or the horizontal. Dur-
ing the recording of the films, movement frequency was synchronized with
a metronome pacing at 1 Hz, so that each unidirectional movement had a
duration of approximately one second. The resulting hand displacement cov-
ered approximately 750 mm in the horizontal and 700 mm in the vertical
movements respectively. Positional data of the fingertip of these movements
were recorded with a miniBIRD system at 103.6 Hz in three dimensions.
Recordings of the x and z coordinates of these movements were subsequently
used to create motion trajectories of a filled circle that served as the object
stimulus. Thus, all movements comprised biological motion in terms of nat-
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ural kinematics, which rendered them comparable in this respect. The size
of the circle with a radius of 20 pixel was chosen so that it approximately
corresponded to the area covered by the hand of the human model on the
screen. Images covered an area of 720 x 576 pixel centred in the middle of
the screen.
Films and animated object motion were used as stimuli in the dynamic
display condition. In the static display condition, static images of the turning
points of the oscillatory movements were presented for 400 ms, separated by
a black blank screen. The interstimulus interval was set to 600 ms to avoid
the perception of apparent motion.
The object as well as the right hand of the human model were coloured
red or green. This colour cue served as the imperative stimulus for the partic-
ipants and thus indicated the orientation of the required response movement.
8.2.4 Task
In each condition, participants had to produce cyclical oscillatory movements
in response to various stimulus displays. Those response movements could
either be horizontally or vertically oriented. The orientation of movement was
cued by the colour of the model’s hand or the colour of the object respectively.
Participants were instructed to respond accurately and as fast as possible
with horizontal movements in response to a red coloured stimulus and vertical
movements when hand or object were green. In addition, they were told to
subsequently synchronize their movement with the observed movement rate
of the model/object at a rate of about 0.5 Hz.
8.2.5 Design and procedure
The experiment started with three blocks of familiarization, in which partic-
ipants received their instructions and were introduced to the experimental
setup and conditions.
In the first block of familiarization, participants perceived either a red
or a green ball-like object appearing in the middle of the screen and had to
perform horizontal or vertical movements according to a colour-orientation-
mapping rule, which was attached to the apparatus just below the screen and
remained there throughout the experiment. This initial block served to es-
tablish the mapping between colour stimulus and response orientation and to
give participants the opportunity to find a comfortable and stable oscillatory
movement pattern. Participants were told to realize an unconstrained arm
movement that comprised wrist, elbow, and shoulder joints without artifi-
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cially freezing any degrees of freedom. More specifically, painting movements
were used as a metaphor in the instruction. They were also told to choose
a comfortable movement amplitude approximately in the range between 400
and 700 mm.
In the second and third block of familiarization, participants were intro-
duced to the stimuli that corresponded to each experimental conditions, i.e.
stimulus type (human model versus ball-like object), mode of presentation
(static versus dynamic display), response orientation (green hand/ball ver-
sus red hand/ball), and orientation congruency (stimulus motion within the
same plane versus stimulus motion in the plane perpendicular to response
orientation). These blocks were also used to familiarize participants with the
task (”React as fast as possible to the colour cue and subsequently synchro-
nize your movement frequency with the frequency of the stimulus without
considering its direction of movement”). Accordingly, they experienced each
condition once. While the second familiarization block comprised the static
display stimuli, the third block served to introduce the continuous motion
stimuli in the dynamic display condition.
The actual experiment consisted of three blocks, which each comprised
16 trials. Each movement trial started with the presentation of a blank
screen. Subjects positioned their right hand in a neutral position in front of
their body, from where horizontal and vertical movements could be rapidly
initiated, and were told to be ready to respond. After a randomly chosen
foreperiod of 500, 700, 900, 1100 or 1300 ms, the stimulus appeared on the
screen and subjects initiated their movement in the direction indicated by the
colour cue as fast as possible. The foreperiod was randomly varied between
trials to prevent participants from knowing the precise time at which the
stimulus would appear.
For the static display condition, a trial started with one of the two stim-
ulus pictures depicting a turning point of either a horizontal (rightward po-
sition) or a vertical movement (upward position). The picture was presented
for 400 ms. No neutral middle position was shown beforehand to prevent
the perception of apparent motion. The dynamic display condition began
with a continuous rightward or upward movement, which started from a neu-
tral middle position. Thus, information regarding the model’s direction of
movement was presented either statically or dynamically at approximately
the same time.
In both display condition, each trial lasted 20 seconds and comprised ten
back-and-forth movements. After 20 seconds, the screen turned black and
participants were told to prepare for the next trial. Intertrial intervals were
fixed at five seconds to prevent fatigue. However, rest breaks were allowed
when necessary. The whole experiment took approximately 45 minutes. The
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order of experimental conditions was counterbalanced across participants and
across blocks by using a Latin square (1 2 16 3 15...), which yielded 16
possible block structures. Three of those block structures were assigned to
each participant. Thus, each experimental condition as well as each possible
transition from one conditions to another occurred equally frequent across the
whole experiment. In this and all subsequent experiments, an experimenter
monitored each participant throughout the entire testing session in order to
make sure that all procedures were carried out correctly.
8.2.6 Data reduction and analysis
For each trial, the x, y, and z positions of the finger were recorded, but only
x and z data were analyzed. The resulting time series were low-pass filtered
(fourth-order Butterworth filter, 10 Hz, dual pass) and differentiated (two-
point central difference algorithm). Separate velocities along the x and z
axes were calculated. Movements were analyzed in terms of three parame-
ters: reaction time, main movement orientation and movement variability in
terms of the variance of the positional data orthogonal to the main movement
orientation.
Reaction time was defined as the time it took participants to initiate
their response with the required orientation. It was determined based on
movement onset along the orientation required by the colour cue. Therefore,
velocity along the z-axis was subtracted from velocity along the x-axis for
horizontally oriented movements and vice versa for vertically oriented move-
ments. Accordingly, negative velocity values of the resulting difference curve
indicated movements with the wrong orientation. Using this difference curve,
a forward search, which started at stimulus onset, determined those samples
that exceeded five percent of peak velocity along the movement orientation
required by the colour stimulus for the first time, and remained larger for 200
ms thereafter. Due to the continuous character of the response, there were no
response errors. Even though participants might have initiated movements
along the wrong orientation, they had enough time to correct this once they
became aware of their error. Those trials were included in the analysis.
For the kinematical analysis of individual movements (sample trajecto-
ries can be seen in Figure 8.1), the continuous oscillatory movements were
segmented into single movements from right to left and from left to right for
horizontal conditions, and from top to bottom and from bottom to top for
the vertical movements. Segmentation was based on the velocity of the finger
along the x-axis for horizontal and along the z-axis for vertical movements.
Movement segments with extremely short durations (< 200 ms) or short dis-
66 Experiment 1: Selection and Execution
tances travelled (< 5 cm) were discarded as stationary phases at the turning
points of the oscillatory movements and not included in subsequent analyses.
So were movements that strongly deviated from the response direction as
cued by the colour of the stimulus (directional error >= 45◦). Thus, only the
actual movement phases were included in the analysis.
Figure 8.1: Example movement trajectories made in the XZ plane by a single participant.
For the purpose of demonstration, movements were normalized so that their mean along
the x- and z-axis is equal to zero. The plots show horizontal and vertical movements
during the observation of (A) congruent stimulus motion and (B) incongruent stimulus
motion performed by a human model in the dynamic display condition. The Figure shows
displacement in mm on both axes.
Previous studies used orthogonal variance of oscillatory movements with
respect to an extrinsic Cartesian reference system (e.g. Bouquet et al., 2007;
Kilner et al., 2003, 2007; Stanley et al., 2007). In the present study, indi-
vidual submovements were represented by the 95 percent confidence ellipse
of the distribution of the sampled data points for each trajectory by using
principal component analysis; the length of the semi-axes of this ellipse are
the square roots of the eigenvalues of the variance-covariance matrix of the
individual point distribution scaled to contain 95 percent of the theoretical
point population (Johnson & Wichern, 1982). For the kinematical analy-
sis, the movement confidence ellipse is characterized by (a) its orientation,
defined as the angle between the major axis of the ellipse and the x-axis;
and (b) its orthogonal variability, defined as the length of the minor axis of
the confidence ellipses. Note that this requires a multiplication of the length
of the semi-axes by the factor 2. This multiplication with a constant factor
does not affect statistical analyses. This procedure affords a decomposition of
orthogonal variance as used in previous studies into two components, a direc-
tional component in terms of main movement orientation, and a variability
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component in terms of variance orthogonal to the main movement direction.
Finally, a change in movement orientation of orthogonal variance in incon-
gruent trials is conceived to reflect perceptuomotor assimilation, whereas a
change in either of the two variables in congruent trials is conceived to rep-
resent perceptuomotor contrast.
In this analysis as well as in the following ones, the first four movements,
i.e., two cycles, were omitted to prevent the data from being affected by
the surprise of the visual stimulus appearing on the screen. From the re-
maining movements, means were computed for each stimulus condition and
each block of trials. Each mean was thus based on approximately sixteen
movements. These individual means were analyzed in a five-way analysis of
variance (ANOVA) with the within-participant factors stimulus type (human
actor versus object), mode of presentation (static versus dynamic display),
response orientation (horizontal versus vertical), congruency (same orienta-
tion versus orthogonal orientation), and block of trials.
In this as well as in all subsequent experiments, the Greenhouse-Geisser
epsilon (Greenhouse & Geisser, 1959) was evaluated to determine whether the
repeated measures data met the assumption of sphericity ( > 0.75). In cases
where sphericity was not met, the F statistic was evaluated for significance
by using the Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted degrees of freedom, though the
uncorrected degrees of freedom are reported. In all subsequent analyses, the
significance level was set to .05. For the effects that were not significant, p
values are only reported for analyses in which F > 1.
8.3 Results
Results are first reported in terms of reaction times and second in terms of
movement kinematics. Data are presented averaged across blocks.
8.3.1 Reaction time
The most important result with respect to reaction times is shown in Figure
8.2. For the dynamic display condition, in which participants were watching
continuously moving stimuli, reaction times were significantly slower in in-
congruent trials than in congruent trials, regardless of the type of stimulus
(791 ms vs. 677 ms for the human model, and 766 ms vs. 607 ms for the
object). For the static display of movement turning points that merely im-
plied motion, such slowing only emerged in trials in which the human model
was part of the stimulus display (857 ms vs. 738 ms for the human model,
and 724 ms vs. 701 ms for the object). This pattern of results gave rise to
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a significant three-way-interaction involving the factors stimulus type, mode
of presentation and congruency, F (1,15) = 5.6, p < .05, η2 = .27.
Figure 8.2: Mean reaction times in response to human (red) and object (green) stim-
uli, displayed separately for each mode of presentation (static versus dynamic), and for
congruent and incongruent trials. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.
Furthermore, reaction times were generally higher in incongruent, 785 ms,
than in congruent trials, 681 ms, giving rise to a significant main effect of
congruency, F (1,15) = 10.7, p < .01, η2 = .42. Participants also responded
faster to moving than to static stimuli, 711 vs. 755 ms, and were also sig-
nificantly faster in responding to the object with a mean reaction time of
700 ms, whereas it took them 766 ms to respond to stimulus displays that
involved the human actor, F (1,15) = 4.8, p < .05, η2 = .24, and F (1,15) =
14.1, p < .01, η2 = .50 respectively.
8.3.2 Kinematics
Movement Variability
The most conspicuous finding with regard to movement variability was a sig-
nificant four-way-interaction of stimulus motion, stimulus type, congruency,
and response orientation, F (1,15) = 5.7, p < .05, η2 = .28. As can be seen
in Figure 8.3, while virtually no effects of the stimulus display were found for
vertical response movements, a significant difference between congruent and
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incongruent trials appeared only when participants had to respond to a hu-
man model in the dynamic display condition, in which continuous movements
were shown. In contrast, no significant differences were found regarding the
comparisons of congruent and incongruent trials in the remaining conditions.
Figure 8.3: Mean movement variability orthogonal to main movement direction for hor-
izontally (A) and vertically (B) oriented response movements shown separately for static
and dynamic displays. Bars represent performance in congruent and incongruent trials in
response to human (red) and to object stimuli (green).
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This four-way-interaction gave rise to a multitude of other significant ef-
fects. Accordingly, the difference in orthogonal variance between congruent
and incongruent trials was especially pronounced during the observation a
continuously moving human model, 14.2 mm, as compared to static depic-
tions of movement turning points, 4.5 mm, giving rise to a significant inter-
action of stimulus type, mode of presentation, and congruency, F (1,15) =
5.7, p < .05, η2 = .28, which together formed the basis for a significant main
effect of stimulus type, F (1,15) = 15.2, p < .01, η2 = .50, and a marginally
significant main effect of congruency, F (1,15) = 4.4, p < .1, η2 = .23, as well
as a significant interaction of those two factors, F (1,15) = 10.4, p < .01, η2
= .41.
The statistical analysis also showed that horizontal movements were sig-
nificantly more variable than vertical movements, F (1,15) = 22.5, p < .01,
η2 = .62. Within vertically oriented response movements, experimental vari-
ations of the stimulus display did not affect movement variability. Together
with the interaction effect described above, this gave rise to significant inter-
actions of response orientation and congruency, F (1,15) = 5.9, p < .05, η2 =
.28, response orientation and type of stimulus, F (1,15) = 13.4, p < .01, η2 =
.47, response orientation and mode of presentation, F (1,15) = 7.8, p < .05,
η2 = .34, and finally response orientation, type of stimulus, and congruency,
F (1,15) = 10.9, p < .01, η2 = .42.
Movement Orientation
For the main movement orientation, the ANOVA revealed ı¨£¡ besides the
highly significant, but trivial main effect of response orientation, F (1,15) =
32167.9, p < .0, η2 = 1 - a significant interaction of congruency and response
orientation, which indicated a systematic difference of movement orientation
between congruent and incongruent trials when participants had to perform
horizontally oriented movements, F (1,15) = 4.8, p < .05, η2 = .24. However,
the mean difference amounted to only 0.3◦.
8.4 Discussion
The purpose of the first experiment was to assess whether perceptuomotor
crosstalk is sensitive to the presence of biological surface features and biolog-
ical kinematics and whether this differentially affects the response selection
and the online control of action. Results revealed effects of perceptuomotor
crosstalk during both response selection and movement execution, which are
discussed separately in the following sections.
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8.4.1 Perceptuomotor Crosstalk during Response Selection
Results showed that for response selection, the presence of dynamic motion
served as a strong cue, albeit being irrelevant for the current task, which
primed movement execution in the direction of observed movement. Short
reaction times were obtained when the orientation of stimulus and response
movement were congruent, whereas longer reaction times were obtained under
conditions in which orientations of stimulus and response were perpendicular
to each other. In the absence of dynamical motion information, this priming
occurred only in the presence of a human model depicting imitable body
postures. Obviously, only the human posture was perceived to provide an
orientation of (implied) movement, whereas the spatial position of the object
did not affect response selection.
These results are in line with previous empirical work by Stu¨rmer et al.
(2000), who also used a two-choice-reaction-time paradigm to explore percep-
tuomotor crosstalk. In their study, participants had to execute a particular
hand gesture in response to a symbolic imperative stimulus while observing
corresponding or non-corresponding hand stimuli. They found that observa-
tion of both static (= hand posture) and dynamic (= hand gesture) displays
affected reaction times as movement initiation in corresponding conditions
was found to be faster compared to the non-corresponding conditions. The
usage of different stimulus onset asynchronies (SOA; the time between onset
of the relevant and the irrelevant stimulus feature) revealed that reactions to
static and dynamic stimuli differed with respect to their time course. While
the dynamic information inherent in the irrelevant hand gesture always in-
duced a tendency to imitate the observed motion irrespective of the SOA, the
influence of the irrelevant static hand posture was greatest for a SOA of 0 ms
and decayed with increasing SOAs. Based on this, the authors concluded that
perceptuomotor crosstalk for static and dynamic stimuli does not rely on the
same functional basis. Accordingly, they distinguished between two mech-
anisms mediating this correspondence effect, i.e., a state-based mechanism,
which accounts for the correspondence effects observed upon the presentation
of static hand postures, and a movement-based mechanism, which mediates
correspondence based on stimulus inherent movement kinematics.
The potency of the state-based mechanism is based on the notion that ac-
tions are specified in terms of their goal-state (e.g. Rosenbaum, Cohen, Jax,
Weiss, & Wel, 2007). This idea is also present in the Theory of Event Cod-
ing. Within TEC, the ideomotor principle asserts that actions are controlled
by action codes that comprise representations of their perceived effects in
the environment (cf. Hommel et al., 2001). Thus, whenever a stimulus de-
picts the goal state of an action, this should automatically gear up the motor
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system to perform the movement associated with this goal state, which in
turn would lead to the observed interference in response selection. This is in
line with previous studies by Brass et al. (2000, 2001) who reported similar
effects for the comparison of hand postures versus symbolic cues (see chapter
6.2). Accordingly, Stu¨rmer et al. (2000) showed that the presentation of
intermediate postures instead of movement end states abolished the corre-
spondence effect. This type of perceptuomotor crosstalk has been referred to
as ideomotor compatibility, i.e., ”the extent to which a stimulus corresponds
to the sensory feedback from its required response” (p. 52; Greenwald, 1972).
In line with the notion of ideomotor compatibility, only imitable body pos-
tures were found to induce perceptuomotor crosstalk in the present study,
whereas the position of the object did not affect reaction times, even though
it comprised the same spatial information. This indicates that the state-
based mechanism is selectively sensitive to the presence of specific biological
features of stimulus topography in the present task.
The movement-based mechanisms active in the dynamic condition led
to perceptuomotor crosstalk irrespective of the topographic features of the
stimulus. This result, too, can be reconciled within the Theory of Event Cod-
ing. The necessity to specify the orientation of the response movement upon
stimulus presentation automatically primes the perception of the orientation
of the stimulus movement, even though orientation of the stimulus is irrele-
vant for the response (cf. Hommel, 2009; Wykowska et al., in press). The
finding that the effect of stimulus orientation in the presence of dynamic mo-
tion information was not sensitive to biological topographics indicates that
movement orientation is indeed a feature code involved in action planning
and perception (cf. Zwickel et al., in press).
Lastly, some remarks on the conjecture that the present reaction time
effects reflect perceptuomotor crosstalk at the level of response selection are
necessary. In the dynamic display condition, the onset of the imperative
stimulus and the onset of irrelevant stimulus motion coincided. Previous re-
search has suggested a longer latency for the detection of motion direction as
compared to the detection of stimulus onset because the detection of move-
ment direction requires at least a minimal extent of stimulus motion (Tynan
& Sekuler, 1982; Carl & Gellman, 1987), whereas the imperative colour cue
is immediately perceived upon its onset. In combination with the continuous
nature of the present response and the way reaction times were determined as
the time it took participants to initiate appropriately oriented movements, it
might be argued that response selection based on the colour cue had already
been finished and a response had already been initiated as the incongruent
direction information became available. The latter might then have caused
a deflection of the orientation of an already selected, and presumably correct
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response that was shorter than the required 200 ms and thus remained un-
detected by the algorithm. The response had to be corrected subsequently,
which led to longer reaction times. Thus, the observed reaction time differ-
ences would not be localized within the stage of response selection, but would
rather reflect perceptuomotor crosstalk during movement execution.
While this argument cannot definitely be eliminated based on the current
data and setup, there is reason to assume that the reaction time differences
in the dynamic display condition indeed reflect perceptuomotor crosstalk at
response selection. The time required to identify the direction of a move-
ment with a velocity of 1◦/s has been reported to be 200-250 ms (Tynan &
Sekuler, 1982), and to drop with higher stimulus velocity (Ehrenstein, 1993;
cited in Ehrenstein, 1994). Given that the stimulus in the current study
moved approximately with a velocity of 6◦/s, it seems reasonable to assume
that motion orientation was processed fast enough to interfere with response
selection before the selection process is finished in the current task.
8.4.2 Perceptuomotor Crosstalk during Movement Execution
With respect to movement variability, results revealed perceptuomotor cross-
talk, which was specifically tied to stimulus type, mode of presentation and
response orientation: When participants observed horizontal movements by
the human model in the dynamic display condition, movement variability
was found to be larger in congruent trials than in incongruent trials.
With respect to the movement orientation, there was a systematic differ-
ence between congruent and incongruent trials. Analogously to the results
for movement variability, this effect was also limited to horizontal response
movements. However, it was neither modulated by the type of stimulus nor
the mode of presentation.
At present it is difficult to interpret these results since Experiment 1 did
not comprise a proper baseline measure. Thus, it is impossible to discern if
the observation of congruent stimuli actually led to an increase in movement
variability or if the observation of incongruent stimuli led to a decrease in
movement variability, i.e., to determine the nature of perceptuomotor cross-
talk in terms of assimilation or contrast. A similar reasoning can be applied
to the observed difference in movement orientation. It might reflect assimila-
tion based on a counterclockwise shift of movement orientation in incongruent
trials, but also imply contrast caused by congruent stimulus motion. In order
to clarify this issue, Experiment 2 aimed to replicate these findings with the
inclusion of a baseline and a slightly modified experimental procedure.

Chapter 9
Experiment 2: Of Baselines and Directions
9.1 Introduction
The purpose of the second experiment was threefold. Firstly, the reliability
of the results of Experiment 1 should be tested by replicating the specific
crosstalk effects during movement execution observed previously, especially
with regard to the rather particular modulation of crosstalk by response
orientation, stimulus type and presentation mode.
Secondly, it was sought to determine if the perceptuomotor crosstalk ef-
fects observed during movement execution in Experiment 1 originated from
interference during incongruent or congruent trials and should thus be con-
ceived in terms of assimilation or contrast. To this end, the two-choice-
reaction-time-task was abandoned and a continuously assessed baseline was
added to the experiment. Participants were informed about the required re-
sponse at the beginning of each trial. This involved the presentation of arrows
that signalled the direction of response movement within the first two cycles
(= four movements) of each trial. Those movements were used as a baseline,
relative to which movement orientation and variability were then assessed
later in the trial when the display switched from arrows to the presentation
of the stimuli used in Experiment 1.
Thirdly, Experiment 2 aimed to control for another shortcoming of Ex-
periment 1, namely the potential influence of intra- and interindividual dif-
ferences in the relationship between the direction of stimulus motion and
response movements. This feature, in the following referred to as directional
mapping, was not controlled for in Experiment 1 and could potentially distort
the effects. With respect to movement orientation, for instance, the observed
difference between congruent and incongruent trials, in which horizontal re-
sponse movements had to be performed, might actually be an underestima-
tion of the true effect because some participants in some trials might have
chosen to move rightward as the model moved upward (= 90◦ directional
mapping), whereas others decided to move downward (= 270◦ directional
mapping).
Since participants should already be moving in a stable way at a move-
75
76 Experiment 2: Of Baselines and Directions
ment frequency of 0.5 Hz, the initial direction of movement in the dynamic
display and the first posture following the initiation phase in the static dis-
play were manipulated to generate four different directional mappings be-
tween stimulus movements and the participant, i.e., 0◦, 90◦, 180◦, and 270◦.
Directional mappings refer to the counterclockwise angle between the direc-
tion of stimulus and the direction of response motion. Accordingly, in the 0◦
condition, the directions of stimulus and response movements were identical,
whereas they were opposite to each other in the 180◦ condition. In conditions
with directional shifts of 90◦ and 270◦, the response direction was rotated 90◦
and 270◦ counterclockwise to the stimulus direction on the screen.
9.2 Method
Basically, the same setup was used as in the first experiment. However, some
features of the setup were changed in order to accommodate the specific aims
and manipulations of Experiment 2. Those are detailed below.
9.2.1 Participants
Sixteen students of the University of Dortmund, eight men and eight women,
participated in the experiment. They were 20 to 30 years old (mean: 24.7
years; SD: 2.6 years). Each individual had given informed consent prior to
the start of the experiment. They received 10 euros or course credit for their
participation.
9.2.2 Apparatus
Increased computational performance allowed that stimulus presentation and
data collection could be controlled by a single computer. The LCD monitor
was replaced by a CRT display. This was done to improve the quality of
motion depiction by an increase in the refresh rate of the screen and to achieve
a more accurate synchronization of data collection and stimulus presentation
within one refresh cycle. In consideration of the increased duration of the
experiment, participants were seated in front of the computer screen.
9.2.3 Task
The task was essentially the same as in the previous experiment. This time
however, no speeded reaction to a colour stimulus was required. Participants
were only told to synchronize their movements to the stimulus motion as
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accurately as possible.
9.2.4 Stimuli
The same stimuli were used as in Experiment 1. Even though there was no
need for a discriminative colour stimulus, the right hand of the human model
remained coloured green to maintain its visual saliency. The colour of the
object, which moved on a black background, was set accordingly.
9.2.5 Design and Procedure
Experimental manipulations comprised the type of stimulus (human model
versus object), the mode of presentation (static versus dynamic), the orien-
tation of response movement (horizontal versus vertical), and the directional
mapping (0◦ versus 90◦ versus 180◦ versus 270◦), which yielded a four-factorial
2x2x2x4 within-subject design. The resulting 32 experimental conditions
were counterbalanced across participants according to the following schemes:
Experimental chunks were generated from the combination of response ori-
entation and mode of presentation. This yielded four experimental chunks,
each of which comprised the combination of type of stimulus and directional
mapping. Those eight trials within a chunk were presented in a randomized
order in each block. The order to chunks was counterbalanced across par-
ticipants based on a Latin square. The order to chunks within a block was
constant within participants.
The experiment comprised three blocks. Each block consisted of 32 (4x8)
consecutive trials lasting 21 seconds each. The general procedure of an ex-
perimental trial is depicted in Figure 9.1. At the beginning of each trial
(preparation phase), a counter counted down from 3 at a pace of 1 Hz. This
way, participants could already pick up the pace for the subsequent move-
ment. At the count of zero, an arrow that indicated the initial direction of
movement appeared in the centre of the screen. It remained visible for 400
ms, then the screen turned black. After 600 ms, a second arrow that pointed
in the opposite direction from the first one appeared on the screen. After
400 ms, the screen turned black again. Anther 600 ms later, this procedure
was repeated once for a total of two baseline cycles of four seconds duration.
Movements during these two cycles were taken as the baseline for each trial.
After the baseline phase, the screen immediately changed to the respective
stimulus presentation of continuous or implied model motion. Participants
were explicitly told not to stop, but to continue their movement in the same
direction, and to temporally synchronize with the stimulus’ motion in order
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to maintain one of four possible directional mappings (Fig. 9.1). Each trial
continued for fourteen seconds and thus comprised seven cycles of oscillatory
movements under the respective experimental condition.
Figure 9.1: Modified experimental paradigm for Experiment 2. For detailed description of
the procedure of a trial see text. Arrows behind the stimulus display indicate the required
response movement direction at stimulus onset. Accordingly, directional mappings, which
describe the angle between stimulus and response motion (counterclockwise), are provided.
Note that even though only the human model in the dynamic display condition is depicted
in the Figure, the same procedure applied to the object model as well. Stimuli in the static
display condition were presented accordingly.
As can be seen in Figure 9.1, explicitly instructing the participants’ move-
ment direction in the baseline phase allowed to establish different directional
mappings between stimulus and response by varying the initial direction of
the stimulus at stimulus onset. Stimulus motion was rotated counterclock-
wise according to the size of the directional shift. Directional mappings of
0◦ and 180◦ imply that stimulus and response take place in the same move-
ment plane, with 0◦ indicating identical directions and 180◦ movements in
opposite directions. For directional mappings of 90◦ and 270◦, stimulus mo-
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tion was rotated counterclockwise to the respective response movement. For
a rightward movement, for instance, a directional mapping of 90◦ implies a
simultaneous upward motion of the stimulus, and 270◦ implies concurrent
downward motion of the stimulus. In case of a participant not responding
in the correct directional relation, the trial was aborted by the experimenter
and repeated by the participant.
9.2.6 Data analysis
Data analysis was carried out in the same way as described in Experiment
1. However, only movement kinematics were analyzed.
9.3 Results
For the kinematic analysis, the oscillatory movements were segmented again
and the same criteria to determine incorrect movements were used as in the
first experiment (duration < 200 ms, distance travelled < 5 cm, directional
error < 45◦). Main movement orientation and orthogonal variance were com-
puted separately for baseline and test phases within each trial. The first four
movements of each test phase were discarded. Again, there were no sig-
nificant interactions involving the factor block so that data are presented
averaged across blocks.
9.3.1 Movement Variability
Overall, the observed pattern of results was similar to Experiment 1. Vir-
tually no effects of the stimulus display were found for vertical response
movements. As can be seen in Figure 9.2, orthogonal variance was only sys-
tematically modulated by the directional mappings when participants had to
respond to a human model in the dynamic display condition. Such systematic
modulation was absent in the presence of the object stimulus. Accordingly,
post-hoc comparisons of horizontal response movements revealed significant
differences in orthogonal variance between dynamic displays of the human
and the object stimulus when participants performed oscillatory movements
in the same movement plane regardless of whether the model moved in the
same or the opposite direction, i.e., for directional mappings of 0◦ and 180◦,
but not for 90◦ and 270◦. Similar to Experiment 1, this gave rise to a sig-
nificant four-way-interaction of stimulus type, presentation mode, response
orientation, and directional mapping, F (3,45) = 5.4, p < .01, η2 = .27.
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Figure 9.2: Mean shift of movement variability orthogonal to main movement direction
relative to baseline as a function of directional mapping, shown separately for (A) horizon-
tal and (C) vertical movements in response to static displays of stimuli, and horizontal (B)
and vertical (D) movements in response to dynamic displays of stimulus motions. Lines
denote human (red) and object (green) stimuli, along with standard errors of the mean.
Accordingly, based on the four-way-interaction, the following effects also
reached significance: A three-way-interaction of type of stimulus, directional
mapping, and response orientation, F (3,45) = 3.0, p < .05, η2 = .17, two-
way-interactions of type of stimulus and directional mapping, as well as type
of stimulus and response orientation, F (3,45) = 3.9, p < .05, η2 = .21 and
F (1,15) = 9.6, p < .01, η2 = .39 respectively, and finally the main effects
of type of stimulus F (1,15) = 9.6, p < .01, η2 = .39, response orientation
F (1,15) = 5.5, p < .05, η2 = .27, and directional mapping, F (3,45) = 4.7, p
< .01, η2 = .24.
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9.3.2 Movement Orientation
In Figure 9.3, relative orientations of response movement are shown. Relative
orientation refers to the difference between the main movement orientation
in the two baseline cycles and the main orientation in the subsequent test
cycles. A positive value indicates a counterclockwise shift in movement ori-
entation. As can be seen, results showed a significant positive bias when
stimulus motion was rotated 90◦ counterclockwise with reference to the re-
sponse movement direction. This was supported by the statistical analysis
with a significant main effect of directional mapping, F (1,15) = 4.1, p < .05,
η2 = .21. However, this positive shift was only significantly different from
zero for horizontal response movements, 0.8◦, F (1,15) = 8.5, p < .05, but not
for vertical ones, 0.3◦, F (1,15) = 1.3, p > .2, giving rise to a highly significant
interaction of directional mapping and response orientation, F (3,45) = 9.0,
p < .01, η2 = .37.
Figure 9.3: Mean orientation of response movements relative to baseline shown sepa-
rately for horizontal and vertical response movements. Coloured bars represent the four
directional mappings between stimulus and response, error bars represent standard errors
of the mean. Positive values indicate a counterclockwise shift.
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9.4 Discussion
The purpose of the second experiment was to assess whether perceptuomotor
crosstalk during movement execution was due to a modulation of movement
orientation and movement variability by congruent or incongruent stimulus
motion. Results revealed an effect of perceptuomotor crosstalk, which was
due to the observation of incongruent stimulus motion and an effect of per-
ceptuomotor contrast during the observation of congruent stimulus motion.
These effects are discussed separately in the following sections.
9.4.1 Perceptuomotor Contrast of Response Variability
The results of Experiment 2 on movement variability, on the one hand, con-
firm, and, on the other hand, extend the findings of Experiment 1. An
increase in movement variability relative to baseline performance was found
when observed and executed movements both occurred within the horizontal
plane. Perceptuomotor crosstalk between simultaneous action execution and
observation indeed manifested as a contrast effect. Perceptuomotor contrast
effects have previously been reported in a variety of tasks such as weight
judgements (Hamilton et al., 2004), stimulus detection and identification
(Mu¨sseler & Hommel, 1997a, 1997b), and visuomotor coordination (Schubo¨
et al., 2001; Schubo¨, Prinz, & Aschersleben, 2004; Zwickel et al., in press).
Zwickel et al. (in press), for instance, had participants perform discrete lin-
ear hand movements of a certain direction while, at the same time, encoding
the direction of an unrelated stimulus motion. They found that perceived
directions were repelled by produced directions and vice versa.
Importantly, the perceptuomotor contrast effect during movement execu-
tion in the present experiment emerged only in the presence of both a biologi-
cal topography of the stimulus and biological kinematics of its motion; neither
a biological velocity profile nor surface features alone were able to elicit this
effect. Instead, it appears that both constitute necessary, but not sufficient
preconditions for the activation of the action-observation-execution-matching
system.
Furthermore, the contrast effect was found to be limited to horizontal
response movements. While this is a rather strange result in itself, it has
been described previously. Kilner et al. (2003) used a similar experimental
paradigm. As described in chapter six, they also found specific interference
effects for the observation of biological motion. Furthermore, they reported
a significant main effect of response direction, according to which orthogonal
variance of horizontal movements had been found to be significantly greater
than orthogonal variance in the vertical direction. They attributed this to
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a natural tendency to perform more arching movements in the horizontal
plane. Even though the interaction of response direction and congruency,
as well as the three-way interaction with the additional factor of animacy
of the stimulus (robot arm vs. human actor) exhibited a significant trend,
F (1,7) = 5.2, p < .1, and F (1,7) = 4.0, p < .1, respectively, the authors
rejected a modulatory influence of response orientation on the observed in-
terference effect. However, Stanley et al. (2007) also reported modulatory
effects of response orientation on perceptuomotor crosstalk. In their study,
the observation of specific effects of perceptuomotor crosstalk was limited to
the horizontal movement plane as well.
Being cautious with between-experiment comparisons, it nevertheless seems
reasonable to assume that the modulatory effect of response orientation on
the specific interference effect of biological motion described by Kilner et al.
(2003) and Stanley et al. (2007) is analogous to the one found in Experi-
ments 1 and 2 of the present study. Thus, it might not be a simple chance
result, which could be attributed to the small sample sizes used in their stud-
ies (cf. Stanley et al., 2007). Consequently, the nature and the reliability of
this modulatory effect of response orientation was taken up and more closely
examined in Experiment 3.
With respect to the study by (Zwickel et al., in press), who reported
a contrast effect for concurrent execution and observation of discrete linear
movements, it is noteworthy that they did not find a systematic relationship
between the size of the contrast effect and the amount of angular separation
between stimulus and response movements (except for the angular separa-
tion of 100◦, in which contrast switched to assimilation). They argued that
perceptuomotor crosstalk occurred at a categorical level, where movement
directions are encoded in terms of up-down or left-right, and that this type
of coding is the preferred coding of movement direction. The present results
of a support such a categorical coding of movement orientation. In terms of
the amount of movement variability, there was no difference between the di-
rectional mappings of 0◦ and 180◦. Similarly, no difference was found between
mappings of 90◦ and 270◦. This indicates that the overlapping codes that
presumably caused the observed contrast effect do not encode a particular
movement direction, but rather an orientation of movement.
9.4.2 Perceptuomotor Assimilation of Response Orientation
As the directional mappings between response and stimulus movements were
pre-established, a significant positive (= counterclockwise) bias of response
direction appeared for the 90◦-mapping whenever participants were perform-
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ing horizontal movements. The effect was not sensitive to the mode of pre-
sentation or the type of stimulus. Contrary to the findings on movement
variability, this systematic shift towards the observed movement reflects as-
similation rather than contrast. This corresponds to findings by Zwickel et al.
(in press), who examined the limits of the observed contrast effect mentioned
in the preceding paragraph by increasing the angular separation between
stimulus and response movement up to 100◦. In this condition, participants
observed a vertical stimulus motion, while they performed an approximately
horizontal movements (10◦ below the horizontal). Zwickel et al. (in press)
found that the previously observed contrast effect turned into an assimila-
tion effect in this condition, i.e. the perceived orientation of vertical stimulus
motion was systematically biased towards movements performed by the par-
ticipants. Moreover, their results show an asymmetry for left- and rightward
responses in that only a combination of rightward response and upward stim-
ulus motion led to a significant deviation of the perceived motion orientation
from the vertical towards the produced movement (assimilation effect). This
directional mapping of stimulus and response is similar to the 90◦ mapping
of horizontal response movements in the present experiment. However, one
cannot definitely rule out the possibility that this asymmetry was due to an
inherent bias in the perception of verticality as no control condition assessed
the participants’ perception in the absence of movement.
On a speculative note, this effect, especially its particular association of
up- and downward stimulus motion with right- and leftward response move-
ments respectively, is somewhat reminiscent of a reaction time effect known
as the orthogonal stimulus-response-compatibility-effect (e.g. Weeks & Proc-
tor, 1990). According to this type of compatibility effect, reaction times are
often shorter for the stimulus-response mappings of up to right and down
to left than for alternative mappings. Recently, Nishimura and Yokosawa
(2006) has demonstrated that orthogonal stimulus-response-compatibility ef-
fects emerge even when the stimulus position is task-irrelevant, as it was the
case with the orientation of the stimulus in the current experiment.
As an explanation, Weeks and Proctor (1990) drew upon the salient fea-
tures coding principle introduced by Proctor and Reeve (1985). It states
that stimulus and response sets are coded with respect to their salient fea-
tures. Hence faster reaction times should be observed when the respective S-
R mapping maintains correspondence of the salient stimulus and the salient
response features. With respect to the structural correspondence of verti-
cally arranged stimuli and horizontally arranged responses, they used word-
picture-verification tasks to demonstrate that up and right are the salient
polar referents along their respective spatial dimension. This would explain
the observed orthogonal compatibility effect based on asymmetrical coding
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of up-down and left-right dimensions. Nowadays, salience has been replaced
by polarity to avoid the implication that different values along a given di-
mension vary with respect to identification time (cf. Proctor & Cho, 2006),
but the argument of the polarity correspondence principle remains the same.
Orthogonal stimulus-response-compatibility has mainly been reported for
speeded binary classification tasks in terms of reaction times and was thus
associated with processes of response selection. The analogy drawn here is
rather far-fetched and not sufficiently backed by the present data. However,
if the correspondence of the polarities of stimulus and response codes is such
”a fundamental aspect of human information processing” (p. 426; Proctor &
Cho, 2006), there seems to be no apriori reason that precludes a polarity-
based explanation of the effect of movement orientation in the present study.
If one accepts that a theory gains in power by explaining seemingly un-
related facts, the present association of a perceptuomotor assimilation effect
in terms of a counterclockwise shift of horizontal response towards vertically
oriented stimuli with orthogonal stimulus-response-compatibility effects cer-
tainly has the potential to add to the credibility of polarity correspondence
beyond the performance of speeded binary classification tasks.

Chapter 10
Experiment 3: On Horizontality
10.1 Introduction
The purpose of Experiment 3 was to further investigate the boundary con-
ditions of the previously found reliable modulation of the perceptuomotor
contrast effect by response orientation. Perceptuomotor contrast was found
to be limited to response movements performed within the horizontal plane,
whereas there were virtually no effects for vertical response movements. For
the present experiment, it is important to note that the modulatory influence
of movement plane occurred irrespective of whether perceptuomotor assimi-
lation (Kilner et al., 2003; Stanley et al., 2007) or contrast (Experiments 1
and 2 of the present study) was observed. Thus, it is unlikely that it is a pure
stimulus artefact or a result of particular properties of the horizontal model
movement in the present study. Instead, it seems as if horizontal response
movements are generally more susceptible to effects of perceptuomotor cross-
talk.
Given that horizontal movements are more variable in general and also
more susceptible to perceptuomotor crosstalk, Experiment 3 aimed to de-
termine what ”‘horizontal”’ actually means, or, more specifically, which ref-
erence system actually defines the horizontal movement plane that affects
perceptuomotor crosstalk in terms of movement variability. Three relevant
frames of reference were distinguished. Each of them defined a horizontal and
vertical axis in space: the gravitational reference frame (GRF), the person
reference frame (PRF), and the stimulus reference frame (SRF). In order to
test how these reference frames interact in generating the modulatory effect
of response orientation on the observed contrast effect, the spatial orientation
of the stimulus as well as the orientation of the participants were systemat-
ically varied as shown in Figure 10.1. While the GRF remained unchanged,
the SRF was varied by rotating the stimulus display, and the PRF was ma-
nipulated by putting the participants in either a sitting or a lying posture.
Subsequently, horizontal and vertical are always used with the respect to the
GRF, which remained constant in all condition.
With respect to the rotation of the SRF, two additional display conditions
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that showed the human model rotated about 90◦ and 180◦ counterclockwise
with reference to the GRF were added. In addition, the spatial orientation
of the PRF was manipulated as well. For that purpose, participants had to
respond while sitting on a chair or lying on their left side on an examination
table, i.e., the PRF was rotated about 90◦ with respect to the GRF.
Figure 10.1: Central experimental manipulations in Experiment 3. Preparation and
baseline were identical to Experiment 2. Additional experimental manipulations comprised
(A) a rotation of stimulus orientation (0◦ vs. 90◦ vs. 180◦), as well as (B) a rotation of the
participant (upright vs. reclined) relative to gravity. Note that even though the different
directional mappings between instructed and observed motion are not depicted, the same
mappings as in Experiment 2 were used.
10.2 Methods
10.2.1 Participants
Twelve students of the University of Dortmund, three men and nine women
participated in this study. They were 20 to 29 years old (mean: 24.2 years;
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SD: 2.1 years). Each individual had given informed consent prior to the
start of the experiment. They received 10 euros or course credit for their
participation.
10.2.2 Apparatus
The experiment was conducted in a completely darkened room. According
to the experimental conditions, participants were either sitting on a height-
adjustable chair or lying on their left side on an examination couch. In both
conditions, the computer screen was placed at a distance of about 100 cm
in front of them and was positioned on eye level. Data were collected in the
same way as described in the previous experiments.
10.2.3 Task
The task was the same as in Experiment 2.
10.2.4 Stimuli
In this experiment, only continuous motion of the human model was used
as a stimulus. This was the condition for which perceptuomotor contrast
modulated by response direction was found in the previous experiment.
10.2.5 Design and Procedure
The experiment consisted of twelve blocks, which were organized in four ex-
perimental phases. Each phase was associated with the participant sitting
upright or lying on their left side. The order of the phases was either sit-
lie-sit-lie or lie-sit-lie-sit. Each phase comprised three blocks, each of them
containing one of the three possible stimulus orientations (0◦, 90◦, 180◦). The
order of the posture of the participant and the rotation of the stimulus was
counterbalanced across participants. Each block comprised eight trials, in
which all possible combinations of response orientation and directional map-
ping (cf. Experiment 2) occurred once in a randomized order. Experimental
procedure within a trial was the same as in Experiment 2.
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10.2.6 Data reduction and analysis
Data analysis was conducted in the same way as in Experiment 2, except that,
due to larger variances of the baseline trials, especially when participants were
lying, baseline measures were averaged across trials for the sitting and lying
position respectively. Furthermore, separate ANOVAs were conducted for
the sitting and the lying position.
10.3 Results
As in the previous experiments, no differences between blocks of trials were
significant according to the statistical analysis. Thus, data are presented
averaged across blocks.
10.3.1 Sitting
Results in terms of movement variability are shown in Figure 10.2. As can be
seen in Figure 10.2A, the observation of a normally oriented (0◦) or inverted
(180◦) human model led to an increase in movement variability for directional
mappings of 0◦ and 180◦. Similar to the results of Experiment 2, this variation
of movement variability across directional mappings was only present for
horizontal movements and absent for vertical movements.
This pattern of results was supported by a significant interaction of stimu-
lus rotation and directional mapping, F (6,66) = 2.3, p < .05, η2 = .17, as well
as a significant three-way interaction of stimulus rotation, directional map-
ping, and response orientation, F (6,66) = 2.4, p < .05, η2 = .18. These effects
also gave rise to a significant main effect of directional mapping, F (3,33) =
5.8, p < .01, η2 = .35. Furthermore, horizontal response movements were
again found to be more variable than vertical ones, F (1,11) = 3.4, p < .1, η2
= .24,
10.3.2 Lying
The ANOVA on movement variability for the blocks in which participants
were lying on the examination table during movement observation and exe-
cution revealed no significant main effects or interactions.
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Figure 10.2: Mean relative variability orthogonal to main movement direction (with
standard errors of the mean), shown separately for sitting participants performing hor-
izontal (A) and vertical (C) response movements, and for lying participants performing
horizontal (B) and vertical (D) response movements. Coloured bars represent performance
under different directional mappings. Response and stimulus motion could either occur
within the same plane (red bars) or in movement planes that were perpendicular to each
other (green bars).
10.4 Discussion
The purpose of the third experiment was to replicate the previously observed
modulatory influence of response direction on perceptuomotor contrast in
terms of movement variability and to explore the relative contribution of
horizontality as defined in different frame of reference. Results from the
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model orientation of 0◦, which corresponded to the observation of continuous
motion by a human model as employed in Experiment 2, replicate the pre-
viously observed pattern of results across directional mappings. This further
corroborates the reliability of both the observed perceptuomotor contrast ef-
fect in congruent trials and the modulation of perceptuomotor contrast by
response orientation.
Furthermore, perceptuomotor contrast was also found in the 180◦ (=in-
verted) model orientation, with a pattern across directional mappings that
was similar to the pattern observed in Experiment 2 and in the 0◦ condition
of the present experiment.
The results clearly show that perceptuomotor contrast observed within
the horizontal movement plane is not tied to a particular frame of reference.
All three reference frames need to be aligned for perceptuomotor contrast to
emerge, Furthermore, the finding of similar effects for the 0◦ and the 180◦
stimulus display supports the abstract coding of movement orientation, which
was proposed in Experiment 2. In the 180◦ display, the horizontal and the
vertical axes of the SRF, though being inverted, have the same orientation
as the horizontal and the vertical in the 0◦ display of the SRF, i.e., they are
both aligned to the GRF. Analogous to this equivalence of 0◦ and the 180◦,
Grossman and Blake (2001) measured BOLD response during the observation
of scrambled motion, and point-light displays of human movements, which
were either shown with an upright or inverted stimulus orientation. They
found that inverted biological motion activated posterior superior temporal
sulcus more than scrambled motion, but less than upright biological motion.
This suggests that for a stimulus to be classified as animate, at least in terms
of the visual analysis of an observed action, it does not matter whether the
human motion is depicted upright or inverted.
The present findings provide an analogous finding with a visuomotor coor-
dination task by demonstrating that a specifically biological effect of percep-
tuomotor contrast is also still present, when an inverted version of a human
model is presented. However, no systematic effects of perceptuomotor cross-
talk emerged neither for the 90◦ condition, not for any experimental condition
that involved a lying position of the participants, which indicates that the
effect disappears as soon as the PRF or the SRF are not aligned with the
GRF anymore (note that for the inverted stimulus display, the axes of SRF,
PRF and GRF are aligned, the SRF is just rotated about 180◦).
Chapter 11
Experiment 4: Generalizability To
Circular Movements
11.1 Introduction
In the previous experiments, response as well as stimulus movements were
linear, i.e., they could be defined by a one-dimensional movement vector,
which either described motion along the x- or the z-axis. In congruent tri-
als, or rather in trials with directional mappings of 0◦ and 180◦, there was
a full orientational overlap between stimulus and response motion (overlap
means that both referred to the same one-dimensional vector). In those tri-
als, perceptuomotor contrast emerged as an increase in movement variabil-
ity. In incongruent trials (directional mappings of 90◦ and 270◦), no overlap
at all was present as orientations, and thus the one-dimensional movement
vectors of the stimulus and the response were perpendicular to each other.
Accordingly, no perceptuomotor contrast effect showed up. The purpose of
Experiment 4 was to explore the generalizability of this pattern of results to
a case, in which response movements did comprise both an overlapping and
a perpendicular, non-overlapping orientation.
To this end, circle drawing was chosen as the new experimental task. A
continuous circular motion can be conceived as a superposition of a sine-wave
and a cosine-wave, or as a two-dimensional movement vector that describes
motion along orthogonal spatial dimensions. It thus comprises both, an x-
and a z-component, whereas the observed movements still comprised only
motion along the x- or the z-axis.
Accordingly, participants in this experiment were asked to continuously
produce circles while simultaneously observing the linear movements of ex-
periment one and two performed by the human actor or the object in either
a horizontal or a vertical orientation. As in the previous two experiments, as
well as in many studies on circle drawing (e.g. Franz, Zelaznik, & McCabe,
1991; Franz, 1997), movements were performed at a preferred, self-selected
circle size and thus, given the task constraint of synchronizing movements
with the stimuli at approximately 0.5 Hz, at a preferred velocity.
93
94 Experiment 4: Generalizability To Circular Movements
11.2 Method
11.2.1 Participants
Sixteen students of the University of Dortmund, nine men and seven women,
participated in the experiment. They were 18 to 30 years old (mean: 23.1
years; SD: 3.5 years). Each individual had given informed consent prior to
the start of the experiment. They received 10 euros or course credit for their
participation.
11.2.2 Apparatus
The same apparatus as in the previous experiments was used.
11.2.3 Task
Participants had to perform continuous circular movements with their right
arm while observing the same dynamic and static displays of a human model
or an object as presented in Experiment 2. Stimulus motion (continuous in
case of dynamic and implied in case of static displays) was again linear. The
orientation of stimulus motion was either vertical or horizontal. Participants
were instructed to temporally synchronize their circular movements with the
reversal points of the stimulus’ movement.
11.2.4 Stimuli
The same stimuli as in Experiments 2 were used.
11.2.5 Design and Procedure
With respect to presentation mode, a control condition was added to check
for unspecific effects of directing attention towards either the x- or the z-axis
by the initially presented arrows (see description below). This control condi-
tion corresponded to a static display of the human model or the object in a
neutral position, i.e., the end effector positioned in the centre of the screen.
Thus, experimental manipulations comprised the type of stimulus (human
model versus object), the mode of presentation (static versus dynamic versus
control), and the orientation of stimulus motion (horizontal versus vertical),
which yielded a three-factorial 2x3x2 within-subject design. The resulting
twelve experimental conditions were divided into two experimental chunks
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according to the factor response orientation. Each chunk comprised a combi-
nation of the remaining factors stimulus type and presentation mode, which
are arranged in a randomized order. Two chunks formed one block of twelve
trials and the experiment consisted of six blocks. The order of blocks were
counterbalanced across participants (ABABAB or BABABA).
Figure 11.1: Modified experimental paradigm for Experiment 4. This time, arrowheads
were presented within a circle template and participants were instructed to synchronize
their circular movement in space and time with the circle-arrows. Only the human model
in the dynamic display condition is depicted. The dynamic display of the object and the
static displays were set accordingly.
After the initial countdown, an arrow within a circle template appeared,
indicating both, the direction of movement, which was always clockwise, and
the starting point of the circular motion. The initial starting point of the
circular movement corresponded to the direction of stimulus movement or the
direction connecting the two stimulus postures, i.e., it was on the top of the
circles (90◦) in trials, in which subsequent stimuli showed vertical movement
or up-down-postures, or at the circles’ rightmost location (0◦) for trials with
horizontal motion or right-left postures. The arrow remained onscreen for 400
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ms, then the screen turned black for 600 ms and then, the circular template
reappeared, but this time with the arrow on the opposite side of the circle,
i.e., at 270◦ for vertical and 180◦ for horizontal motion. This was repeated
once so that participants had enough time to initiate the circular movement
at the respective pace.
As in Experiments 2 and 3, the initiation phase was followed by the
respective stimulus display. Stimulus presentation was constrained. Arrow-
heads that appeared at 0◦ and 180◦ were always associated with subsequent
horizontal stimulus motion or the control condition. Accordingly, arrowheads
that appeared at 90◦ and 270◦ were always followed by vertical stimulus mo-
tion or the control condition. For the control condition, which depicted either
the human model or the object in a neutral position, static displays were used
with the exact same timing as employed in the other static displays.
Intertrial intervals were set to ten seconds and additional rest breaks
were given as needed to avoid fatigue. Between blocks three and four, a
three-minute rest break was given filled with irrelevant conversation. Each
testing session lasted approximately 45 minutes.
11.2.6 Data Reduction and Analysis
For the subsequent kinematic analysis of individual movements, the first two
circles after the stimulus onset were discarded as in the previous experiments.
The remaining circles were centred around their respective barycentre and
displacement of the circular movements along the x- and z-axis was calcu-
lated based on the zero crossings on the x- and z-axis. Means of each de-
pendent variable along with one measure of variability (standard deviation,
SD) were computed for each trial and each subject. In the next step, dif-
ference scores were computed by subtracting the mean displacement along
the x- and z-axis respectively in both dynamic and static displays of model
motion, from the control condition. Those difference scores, in the following
referred to as x-deflection or z-deflection respectively, were each analyzed in
a three-factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA) for repeated measures with
the relevant within-subject factors type of stimulus, mode of presentation,
and stimulus orientation.
11.3 Results
Mean x- and z-deflections are shown in Figure 11.2. X-deflection (Fig. 11.2A
and 11.2B) was found to differ significantly from zero when participants ob-
served horizontal human stimulus motion in both static and dynamic dis-
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plays, 7.7 mm, F (1,15) = 19.6, p < .0005, and 19.9 mm, F (1,15) = 43.7,
p < .0005, respectively. All other tests against zero failed to approach the
Bonferroni-adjusted level of significance.
Accordingly, the analysis of variance revealed that x-deflection was par-
ticularly pronounced during the observation of continuous horizontal move-
ments by the human model. The respective three-way interaction of stimulus
type, mode of presentation, and stimulus orientation was significant, F (1,15)
= 5.7, p < .05, η2 = .27. This interaction gave rise to other significant ef-
fects. X-deflection was also found to be larger during the observation of the
dynamic display of continuous stimulus motion as compared to the static dis-
play of movement turning points, 9.1 mm vs. 2.2 mm, F (1,15) = 18.6, p <
.01, η2 = .61, and it was also larger in trials, in which participants observed
stimulus motion along the x-axis, 10.5 mm, as compared to motion along the
z-axis, 0.8 mm, F (1,15) = 6.6, p < .05, η2 = .31.
For movement deflection along the z-axis, a similar pattern of specific
interference emerged. Z-deflection was only significantly different from zero,
23.9 mm, F (1,15) = 40.4, p < .0005, during the observation of vertically
oriented continuous motion by a human model. This nicely corresponds to
the findings for x-deflection and horizontal stimulus motion. The respective
three-way interaction of stimulus type, mode of presentation, and stimulus
orientation was marginally significant, F (1,15) = 3.6, p < .1, η2 = .19.
Again, this pattern of z-deflection across stimulus conditions gave rise
to several significant main effects and interaction effects. Whereas the main
effect stimulus orientation was only marginally significant, F (1,15) = 3.1, p =
.1, η2 = .17, it pointed in the expected direction since it was larger for vertical
than for horizontal stimulus motion, 10.0 mm vs. 5.4 mm. Furthermore,
larger deflections were found for dynamic displays, 11.2 mm, as compared to
static displays, 4.2 mm, F (1,15) = 21.1, p < .01, η2 = .58, as well as for the
observation of human as compared to object stimuli, 10.6 mm vs. 4.7 mm,
F (1,15) = 4.6, p < .05, η2 = .24.
Lastly, the ANOVAs on the standard deviations of x- and z-deflection
revealed no significant main effects or interactions.
11.4 Discussion
The purpose of Experiment 4 was to examine perceptuomotor crosstalk with
movement orientation as the overlapping feature of stimulus and response in
a situation, in which the orientation of stimulus movements did overlap with
the orientation of one component of a circular movement.
Therefore, the paradigm was slightly modified by using a task that had
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Figure 11.2: Mean deflection along the x-(A-B) and z-axis (C-D) shown separately for
horizontal (A,C) and vertical (B,D) stimulus motion. Coloured bars represent mean de-
flection as a function of type of stimulus and mode of presentation. Errors bars indicate
standard errors of the mean. Deflection is defined as the change in displacement along
the respective axis in an extrinsic Cartesian coordinate system relative to the control con-
dition, which showed a neutral stimulus without orientation information present in the
display.
previously been shown to produce interlimb crosstalk, i.e., circle drawing. In
contrast to Experiments 1, 2, and 3, the circular response movements required
by the participants in this experiment comprised motion along two spatial
axes. This way, the coupling between observed and generated movements
comprised a partial overlap within one of the two spatial dimensions used
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in movement execution as compared to full overlap in the congruent and
nill overlap in the incongruent trials of the previous three experiments with
one-dimensional movements.
Results revealed that when the circular trajectories were decomposed in
orthogonal directional component vectors along the x- and z-axis, spatial
coupling was observed for motions in the dominant dimension of the observed
movement. This effect was found to be specific for the observation of a human
model. Object motion did not affect either component vector. Furthermore,
only continuous model motion in the dynamic display condition yielded the
effect.
Circle drawing has previously been used to investigate spatial as well as
temporal coupling of two movements (e.g. Franz et al., 1991; Franz, 1997;
Semjen, Summers, & Cattaert, 1995). The present results correspond to
studies on bimanual coordination that had demonstrated specific patterns
of perceptuomotor crosstalk, when the two hands were assigned to perform
different movements. Franz et al. (1991), for instance, asked their partici-
pants to continuously draw circles with the one hand while simultaneously
performing repeated cycles of lines with the other hand. Aside from temporal
coupling of the two limbs characterized by a 1:1 frequency ratio, they also
found spatial coupling that made the trajectories of the circular movements
become more linear and the trajectory of the lines become more circular.
However, in these studies, movement parameters were thought to be chan-
nelled to two different effectors both part of the same body and thus con-
trolled by the same brain. More specifically, it was argued that spatial cou-
pling in bimanual coordination was mediated by cortical interactions via the
corpus callosum. Accordingly, spatial coupling was found to be absent in
callosotomy patients (Franz, Eliassen, Ivry, & Gazzaniga, 1996).
In the present experiment, no cortical interactions between the two end
effectors were present. However, perceptuomotor crosstalk reminiscent of
spatial coupling was observed. This is in line with previous research, which
showed that principles governing interlimb coordination such as the Haken-
Kelso-Bunz equation (Haken, Kelso, & Bunz, 1985; Kelso, 1995) also applies
to rhythmic coordination between persons, regardless of whether this inter-
personal coordination is achieved intentionally or developed spontaneously
(e.g. Richardson, Marsh, Isenhower, Goodman, & Schmidt, 2997; Schmidt
& O’Brien, 1997). The present results are in line with this as they extend
findings from intraindividual to inter individual bimanual coordination. How-
ever, the specificity of the perceptuomotor assimilation to the observation of
an animate agent also supports the notion of a difference between interper-
sonal coordination patterns, which presumably rely on a biologically tuned
action-observation-execution-matching system, and person-object coordina-
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tion, which would not require or cannot use such a system.
Chapter 12
General Discussion
The starting point of the study was the notion of a hierarchically organized
action-observation-execution-matching system that augments cognitive func-
tions based on a covert simulation of observed actions. Due to the embodied
nature of sensorimotor simulation within the action-observation-execution-
matching system, it has been argued that the latter is particularly sensitive
to animate as compared to inanimate stimuli. The purpose of the present
study was to investigate the impact of dynamic and static features that cued
the animacy of an observed stimulus. Accordingly, it was distinguished be-
tween biological topography in terms of surface and form features of a human
body and biological kinematics of stimulus motion. Interactions between si-
multaneous perception and execution of intransitive actions were examined
in the presence and absence of these static and dynamic animacy cues.
In four experiments, participants were required to perform continuous os-
cillatory movements with their right arm during the observation of static or
dynamic displays of a human model or an object, both of which were per-
forming movements of either same or orthogonal orientation. Experimental
manipulations comprised a differentiation between discrete and continuous
measures of perceptuomotor crosstalk during response selection and response
execution (Exp. 1), the directional mapping between stimulus and response
motion (Exp. 2), variations of reference frames for visuomotor coordination
(Exp. 3), and the complexity of executed actions (Exp. 4).
All in all, the present study reveals various effects of perceptuomotor
crosstalk. Some of the observed effects were specifically tied to the presence
of animacy, whereas others were found to be insensitive to the presence of
animacy features in the stimulus display.
12.1 Summary of Experimental Findings
In Experiment 1, perceptuomotor assimilation was found for response selec-
tion. In the presence of dynamic motion information, perception of both, a
human model and an object, interfered with response selection. This resulted
in longer reaction times when the observed movement orientation was incon-
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gruent to the response orientation that was required by the imperative colour
cue. For the static display condition, a similar prolonged reaction time was
only found for the presentation of the human model, but not for the object.
During response execution, effects of perceptuomotor crosstalk were observed
in terms of movement variability, which was specifically tied to the presence
of static and dynamic animacy cues, and movement orientation, which was
found to be insensitive to animacy cues.
The origin of the perceptuomotor crosstalk effects during movement exe-
cution was more thoroughly investigated in Experiment 2, which replicated
and extended the findings of Experiment 1. Perceptuomotor assimilation
was found in terms of a systematic counterclockwise shift of response ori-
entation in incongruent trials, which was independent of stimulus type and
presentation mode, but was found to be contingent upon response orienta-
tion and directional mapping. More precisely, this counterclockwise shift of
movement orientation only showed up for horizontal responses and a direc-
tional mapping of 90◦, i.e., for simultaneous rightward response and upward
stimulus motion and for leftward response and downward stimulus motion.
Furthermore, Experiment 2 revealed a perceptuomotor contrast effect during
the execution of horizontal movements in congruent trials. It was shown that
overlapping movement orientations in action observation and execution led
to an increased movement variability as compared to baseline movements.
While contrast was limited to horizontal response movements, it was insensi-
tive to whether perceived and executed movements were of same or opposite
directions, i.e., it occurred for directional mappings of 0◦ and 180◦.
Experiment 3 demonstrated that the modulation of the contrast effect by
response orientation, which was observed in Experiments 1 and 2, was not
tied to a particular reference frame. Furthermore, its result also support the
notion of abstract coding of movement orientation as contrast was also found
when the dynamic human stimulus was presented upside-down.
With respect to the generalizability of perceptuomotor contrast during
movement execution, Experiment 4 showed that contrast turned into assim-
ilation as the response movement became more complex, i.e., consisted of a
circular instead of a linear motion. Nevertheless, crosstalk was still found to
be specific for the observation of dynamic motion of the human model. This
suggests that contrast and assimilation were based on the same functional
mechanisms.
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12.2 Animate Agency: On Topography and Kinematics
The results of all four experiments show that perceptuomotor contrast dur-
ing movement execution emerged only in the presence of both a biological
topography of the stimulus and biological kinematics of its motion; neither
a biological velocity profile nor surface features alone were able to elicit this
effect. Instead, it appears that both constitute necessary, but not sufficient
preconditions for the activation of the action-observation-execution-matching
system. Thus, on the one hand, the presence of biological form/surface fea-
tures of the body seems to be required for the dynamic motion information
to affect movement execution. On the other hand, if no dynamic motion
information is present, no perceptuomotor contrast is observed during move-
ment execution. Apparently, the presence of bodily features allowed the dy-
namic motion information to gain privileged access to the action-observation-
execution-matching system as the observation of object motion did not exert
a similar influence.
This is in line with the findings by Stanley et al. (2007) who suggested
that in their experiment, the reported agency of the object motion was more
important than the actual type of movement kinematics, i.e., biological vs.
non-biological. Thus, biological kinematics were ruled out by Stanley et al.
(2007) as being the cause of the observed sensitivity to animate actions.
Instead, Stanley et al. (2007) favoured the perceived agency of the movement
stimuli as being crucial for perceptuomotor crosstalk to occur.
The present results on perceptuomotor contrast during movement execu-
tion agree with this interpretation. The presence of the human body served
as a perfect cue to communicate animate agency to the participants of each
experiment. Based on this agency cue, the observed movements were pro-
cessed differently as compared to the object movements, presumably within
the action-observation-execution-matching system, and were thus able to in-
terfere with movement execution.
Conceptually, such an agency account would be consistent with work by
Wheatley, Milleville, and Martin (2007). They used fMRI to measure brain
activation in response to moving shapes. The context of these shapes was
varied in a way that they afforded the observation of the moving stimulus
as an animate agent or as an inanimate object. They found no differential
activation with respect to animacy in what they designated as the mirror
system, i.e., the inferior parietal cortex and the ventral premotor/inferior
frontal cortex. An increase in activation was found, however, in what Wheat-
ley et al. (2007) referred to as the social network. Among other cortical and
subcortical areas, this social network comprises regions in the temporal cor-
tex, the superior temporal sulcus and the lateral fusiform gyrus, all of which
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were described in chapter 4 as a part of the occipito-temporal network that
is responsible for the visual analysis of observed actions within the action-
observation-execution-matching system. Based on their findings, Wheatley
et al. (2007) argued that perceived animacy of a stimulus acts as a sys-
temwide alert signal that gears up the action-observation-execution-matching
system to process socially relevant information. This alert signal is generated
during the visual analysis of observed actions within the social network in
the occipito-temporal region including the superior temporal sulcus, which
has been implicated in the perceptual and conceptual processing of biological
motion. The alert signal then triggers a covert simulation of the observed
movement within the action-observation-execution-matching system. This
simulation of an observed action then interferes with the ongoing control of
movement and leads to the present effects of perceptuomotor crosstalk that
were specifically tied to the observation of animate agents.
The reported insensitivity of the fronto-parietal (mirror) part of the action-
observation-execution-matching system, which did not show a modulation of
activation by the presence of animacy in the study by Wheatley et al. (2007),
casts doubts on its biological sensitivity and thus its viability as the origin of
social cognition. Nevertheless its importance in terms of covertly re-enacting
observed actions within a covert sensorimotor simulation process is still valid.
Wheatley et al. (2007) suggested that the fronto-parietal part of the action-
observation-execution-matching system might better be conceived to afford
a domain-independent simulation process, which might be co-opted to in-
terpreting actions of animate agents by domain-specific systems such as the
social network regions, the superior temporal sulcus and the lateral fusiform
gyrus, which were shown to be especially sensitive to the presence of animacy
(e.g. Grossman et al., 2000; Grossman & Blake, 2001; Spiridon et al., 2006).
12.3 On Assimilation and Contrast
12.3.1 Between-Studies
The present results support a specific sensitivity of the action-observation-
execution-matching system to biological stimuli in terms of an increase in
movement variability during the observation of animate actions. Thus, while
this finding is in agreement with previous studies in terms of supporting the
existence of specific perceptuomotor crosstalk for animate stimuli as com-
pared to inanimate stimuli, they differ with respect to the nature of this
crosstalk.
Previous studies, which used a similar paradigm, found perceptuomotor
assimilation instead of perceptuomotor contrast (Kilner et al., 2003, 2007;
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Stanley et al., 2007). More specifically, Kilner et al. (2003) argued that per-
ceptuomotor crosstalk, i.e., larger orthogonal variance in incongruent than in
congruent trials, originated from interference between response and stimulus
orientation in incongruent trials. In contrast, Stanley et al. (2007) suggested
that perceptuomotor crosstalk was due to facilitation of movement perfor-
mance in the congruent condition instead of interference in the incongruent
condition. In this respect, the present results in terms of movement variabil-
ity seem to agree with the latter localization of the effect. In the present
study, the observation of incongruent stimulus motion did not affect orthog-
onal variance during movement execution. Having agreed on the localization
of the effect with Stanley et al. (2007), it still remains unclear why Stan-
ley et al. (2007) found perceptuomotor assimilation, whereas the present
experiment revealed perceptuomotor contrast.
In terms of the Theory of Event Coding (Hommel et al., 2001), assim-
ilation and contrast correspond to the difference between coactivation and
integration of feature codes within an event code (see chapter 5.2). Mere
coactivation is unable to account for the observed contrast effect instead of
assimilation. Instead, contrast arises in TEC from an integrative process
that binds together the feature codes of an event. With reference to work by
Treisman (1988) on the integration of features for perception, it is assumed
that features can only be integrated within one event at a time. Thus, bind-
ing together feature codes makes them unavailable for other event codes, so
that binding for perception interferes with binding for action. In the present
study, this interference results in increased movement variability in congruent
trials.
At this stage, it is unclear what might have triggered integration instead
of coactivation in the present study, which would account for the observation
of perceptuomotor contrast. However, it might be just this difference in
binding that could explain the contrast effect in this experiment as compared
to the assimilation effect in the studies by Kilner et al. (2003) and Stanley
et al. (2007). A possible cause, but this is only speculative, could be the
formulation of the control problem that the sensorimotor system has to solve.
Participants of the present study were always instructed to carefully attend to
the temporal synchronization of their response with the observed stimulus.
Temporal synchronization was explicitly and repeatedly instructed as the
sole demand of the task, whereas movement orientation should be ignored.
A way to achieve temporal synchrony is to specify a detailed goal state of
the system at each point in time, i.e., a spatial position of the end effector
with respect to the model motion. The latter serves as a reference trajectory
for all musculoskeletal degrees of freedom, and the controller has to generate
muscle activations so as to force the plant to synchronize with this trajectory.
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This, of course, would require integration of a feature code, which specifies
movement orientation, but by both processes, the perception/prediction of
model motion as well as the specification of response movements.
Finally, the differential findings of assimilation and contrast might, at
least partly, be due to different dependent variables, which were used to as-
sess perceptuomotor crosstalk. More specifically, the finding of contrast in
terms of movement variability in congruent trials and at the same time as-
similation in terms of movement orientation in incongruent trials implies that
orthogonal variance that is not assessed with respect to the actual movement,
but instead fixed to an extrinsic Cartesian frame of reference (cf. Bouquet
et al., 2007; Kilner et al., 2003, 2007) might be somewhat problematic be-
cause it confounds orientation (in the present study insensitive to animacy)
and variance (in the present study sensitive to animacy) in a single vari-
able. This might distort the observed effects. If this, however, is sufficient
to account for the observed between-study differences of assimilation versus
contrast is doubtable.
12.3.2 Within-Study
The question of under which circumstances perceptuomotor assimilation or
perceptuomotor contrast is observed is not limited to comparing the contrast
effect to other studies. Even within the present study, there were effects
of perceptuomotor assimilation that exhibited sensitivity to the presence of
a human model: the reaction time effect observed for static displays that
depicted postures of the human body (Exp. 1) and the assimilation effect of
observed linear movements on the displacement of a circular motion (Exp.
4).
The differential effects of assimilation at response selection and contrast
during movement execution of linear movements can be reconciled within
the Theory of Event Coding in terms of activation and integration. Move-
ment orientation is a defining feature of the response movement. Uncertainty
about the upcoming response orientation leads to movement orientation re-
ceiving higher intentional weights, which in turn primes its perception. Upon
stimulus onset, the imitable posture of the human stimulus exerts a greater
influence on response selection because it depicts the respective goal state of
one of the two response alternatives. It can be conceived as an instantiation
of ideomotor compatibility as reported previously (e.g. Brass et al., 2001,
2000), where the observation of a potential goal state automatically activates
its associated movement and interferes with the arbitrary stimulus-response
mapping implemented by the imperative colour cue. As the movement is
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initiated, the feature code of orientation is bound with other feature codes
to form an event code. During movement execution in congruent trials, this
event code has to be unbound so that the feature code of orientation can
be used by perception to track the observed movement trajectory. In in-
congruent trials, the event code can maintain its integrity throughout the
whole movement as there is no overlap between movement orientations in
the incongruent trials.
The finding of perceptuomotor contrast in Experiments 2 and 3, and of
perceptuomotor assimilation in Experiment 4 is, of course, puzzling. On
the basis of the present data, it is not possible to draw firm conclusions on
the issue of why perceptuomotor contrast was observed during linear, but
assimilation during circular response movements.
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